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 Abstract 
Market Partitioning, Organizational Identity and Geography:  
Empirical and Simulation Evidence in the German Electricity Market after Deregulation 
By 
Min Liu 
 
 This dissertation develops and tests theories on identity-based resource partitioning in 
the context of the German electricity market after deregulation in 1998. I apply insights from 
the recent theoretical development on organizational identity and pay special attention to the 
roles of audience heterogeneity which is observed through the lens of geography. Based on 
both theoretical arguments and field evidence, I detail the process of identity-based 
partitioning and explore three boundary conditions for sustaining an periphery identity 
oppositional to that of market leaders: intense cooperation among peripheral organizations, 
sufficient audience heterogeneity and short delays in enacting as well as in perceiving the 
periphery identity. I hypothesize that although increasing oppositional identities upon 
competitive release lead to resource partitioning, this effect varies substantially across 
audience segments embedded in geographical communities. Organizational founding rates 
increase with greater match between the peripheral identity and the values endorsed by the 
local community. I also propose while center organizations may absorb the majority of the 
released resources, competitive release leads to higher growth rates of peripheral 
organizations compared with those of the subsidiaries of the center ones. Combining the 
apparently opposing effects of the match between producer identity and audience tastes on 
founding rates and growth rates, I suggest that resource partitioning may occur both at the 
form level through new foundings and at the firm level through organizational growth, 
depending on the strength of the match. The theories and hypotheses are developed and tested 
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using simulation experiments (chapter 2) and longitudinal quantitative data (chapter 3 and 4). 
This dissertation contributes to the theories on resource partitioning and organizational 
identity as well as to research on industrial evolution and sociology of market in general.  
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction and Research Design 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
For its centrality in the modern society, market has long attracted attention from both 
economists (e.g. Smith, [1776] 1976; Chamberlin, 1933; Keynes, 1936; Arrow, 1968; 
Williamson, 1975) and sociologists (e.g. Weber, [1922] 1978; Parsons & Smesler, 1956; 
Polany, [1944] 1957; Granovetter, 1974; White, 1981; Zelizer, 1978; Fligstein, 1990). 
Whereas economists have largely considered market as pricemaking mechanism (but see the 
work in industrial organization and new institutional economics), sociologists have treated 
market as social entities and as aggregate of social actions (Swedberg, 1994). A central 
concern in the sociology of markets deals with the dynamics of market segmentation (Park & 
Podolny, 2000). What drives market differentiation? How does market differentiation unfold 
over time? What are the consequences of market differentiation on organizational fitness? 
These questions are of great importance and have attracted scholarly attention from as 
various research areas as industrial organization (e.g. Tirole, 1988), strategic management 
(e.g. Caves & Porter, 1977) and population ecology (e.g. Carroll, 1985). This dissertation 
aims at contributing to the latter stream of research, and in particular to its theory fragment 
known as resource partitioning.  
The resource partitioning theory, originally developed by Carroll (1985) in his 
seminal work on the American newspaper industry, provides an interpretation for the 
simultaneous existence of the increasing dominance of large generalists and the proliferation 
of small specialists. To survive, generalist organizations depend on a wide range of 
environmental resources, whereas specialists on a narrow one. Before the market gets 
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 partitioned, generalists and specialists compete for the same resources. During the 
competitive process dictated by economies of scale, a few generalists survive, move toward 
the most abundant portion of the market, and grow larger. Increased market concentration is 
the byproduct of this process. Due to inertia and diseconomies of scope, valuable resources 
get released in the periphery of the market and feed the emergence of specialist organizations. 
The competitive process then reaches an equilibrium: generalists and specialists rely on 
distinct resources and do not compete with each other. Therefore, as market concentration 
rises, the mortality rate of generalists should increase whereas that of specialist organizations 
decrease.  
According to its original formulation, a few necessary (but not sufficient) conditions 
are needed for partitioning (Boone et al., 2002: 413; Hannan et al., 2007): (1) a finite and 
heterogeneous resource environment unimodally distributed; (2) the existence of economies 
of scale and scale-based competition among generalists; (3) the presence of inertial forces 
limiting the adaptability of generalist organizations, meaning that generalists cannot be 
transformed into specialists (and vice versa) and that the target areas of generalists consist of 
continuous regions of the resource space. If generalists combine sets of disparate resources, 
they will lose their scale advantage; (4) and crowding.  
In the recent years, the theory has been extended. Carroll and Swaminathan’s (2000) 
study on the U.S. beer brewery movement pointed to the enactment of an identity alternative 
to that of market leaders as a critical trigger of partitioning. The success of specialist 
breweries in fact did not rely on superior quality: blind tasting demonstrated that the products 
of the two producers were undistinguishable. What mattered was the identity of the producers: 
the generalists’ identity as large and modern mass producers turned out to be problematic for 
consumers that believed that authentic specialty beer should be brewed by a craft-like firm 
using traditional methods and natural ingredients. Organizational identity, rather than product 
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 characteristics, guided the choice of audience members and sustained the emergence of 
market partitioning (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000).  
Notwithstanding the developments brought forward by this research, the process 
through which different producer identities emerge remains largely underexplored. First, the 
conditions that favor the emergence of an identity oppositional to that of market leader as 
well as what makes such an identity in sustaining partitioning should be explored. Existing 
research concerning categorization in market contexts appears especially useful to this 
purpose (Hannan et al., 2007; for a review see also Hannan, 2010). According to this body of 
research, an identity is likely to become salient in presence of a enough perceived similarity 
among producers. Similarity facilitates the emergence of a label and of a schema that 
legitimize the existence of peripheral organizations in the eyes of audience members. Indeed, 
the conditions for the legitimation of new organizational form are especially favorable in 
presence of high market concentration: categorical contrast becomes sharper and the high 
density of specialists organizations makes salient the identity oppositional to that of market 
leaders (Hannan et al., 2007: 227). When the above conditions are satisfied, the process of 
competitive release is expected to improve the viability of peripheral organizations (see also 
Pólos et al., 2010).  
Second, the traditional studies of resource partitioning have focused on differences 
among products or producers (for a review see Carroll et al., 2002), ignoring the differences 
in relation to the cognition and the preferences of audience members. An identity approach to 
resource partitioning clearly calls for a shift of the locus from the former to the latter. Third, 
despite the recent theoretical focus on competitive release (Hannan et al., 2007), there exists 
no empirical test on its effects on partitioning processes. Fourth, the majority of the existing 
partitioning research has concentrated on studying founding and death rates of organizations, 
largely overlooking the dynamics of organizational growth under partitioning (but see Boone 
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 et al., 2000; Jaffee, 2001). However, as Carroll and colleagues (2002) pointed out, dynamics 
of growth are both complex and interesting for the theoretical development on resource 
partitioning and therefore worth greater scholarly attention. 
Last, proving the relevance of organizational identity as key triggers of market 
partitioning requires disentangling its effects from those due to product differentiation. For 
example, consumers might prefer specialists producers because of the inherent superior 
quality of their products or because of the identity of such producers. The former mechanism 
was proposed by Carroll (1985); the latter refers to the a more complex evaluation of 
producers’ offerings and hinges upon organizational identities (Hannan et al. 2007). To better 
understand the role of identity in market partitioning, empirical contexts in which product 
differentiation is limited appear especially appealing. 
In this dissertation, I build on the theoretical insights from both resource partitioning 
and organizational identity research and aim at improving our understanding of the identity-
based resource partitioning processes. First, I detail the process of identity-based resource 
partitioning and explore three boundary conditions for sustaining an identity oppositional to 
that of market leaders: intense cooperation among peripheral organizations, sufficient 
audience heterogeneity and short delays in enacting as well as in perceiving the new identity. 
Second, I hypothesize that although increasing oppositional identities upon competitive 
release lead to resource partitioning, this effect varies substantially across audience segments 
embedded in geographical communities. Organizational founding rates increase with greater 
match between the peripheral identity and the values endorsed by the local community. 
Third, I propose while center organizations may absorb the majority of the released resources, 
competitive release leads to higher organizational growth rates of peripheral organizations 
compared with those of the subsidiaries of the center ones. Combining the contradictory 
effects of the match producer identity and audience tastes on founding rates and growth rates, 
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 I suggest that resource partitioning may occur both at the form level through foundings and at 
the organizational level through growth, depending on the strength of the match. The theories 
and hypotheses are developed and tested using simulation experiments (chapter 2) and 
longitudinal quantitative data (chapter 3 and 4), embedded in the empirical context of the 
German electricity market after deregulation in 1998. Incidentally, the limited product 
differentiation traceable within this commodity market makes organizational identities 
paramount. 
1.2 THE EMPIRICAL SETTING 
The German electricity market after deregulation offers an excellent context to study 
the effects of organizational identities on partitioning. Being a commodity market, 
differentiation based on product characteristics is minimal. The German electricity market 
was deregulated in 1998, allowing me to study the emergence of identities after the 
manifestation of a natural-occurring shock. 
The empirical counterpart of the local organizations in this setting is the municipal 
utilities (thereafter MU). Because their collective identity oppositional to that of the market 
leaders is the driving force of partitioning after the deregulation, I first provide information 
about its origins. Municipal utilities in Germany have a long history. Since the late 19th 
century’s urbanization of the German cities, prompted by the concerns for their residents’ 
wellbeing, the local authorities started to provide gas, electricity and water supply as well as 
services in sewage and waste removal, public transport or even local saving banking 
(Sparkasse in German) through the municipal enterprises. By providing these services, local 
authorities acted in the interests of "the common good of the local community" (Wollmann, 
2002). The “local self-government and self-administration” was then legitimated  in Article 
28 of the German Federal Constitution in 1949, making the German local government model, 
5 
 
 alongside the Scandinavian ones, the politically and functionally strongest type of local 
government in international comparison (Hesse & Sharp 1991). Therefore, municipal 
enterprise, i.e. “the share of the municipality in the economy, has been subject to municipal 
self-administration since time immemorial” (Steckert, 2002; Girouard, 1987: 55, 65, 110, 214, 
268). The most important form of municipal enterprises, the so called “municipal utilities” 
(Stadtwerke in German), typically combine the supply of electricity, gas, water, heating, in 
many cases also public transport and sport facilities such as swimming pools. The surpluses 
generated in the “profitable” parts like electricity, gas and water supply, were used to “cross-
subside” the deficit parts like public transport and sport facilities (Wollman, 2002; Püttner, 
1999: 543). The profit made by the municipal utilities, would be used by the municipality, 
enabling the local authorities pay for other activities of common interest such as maintaining 
kindergartens, schools and streets.  
Before the deregulation, there were more than 800 firms in electricity industry, all 
serving both industrial/commercial and household customers in their respective monopoly 
regions. In 1997, eight utilities (the “Big Eight”) operated at the supra-regional level and 
around 80 companies operated at the regional level. According to VDEW (BDEW since 
2007), the German Association of Energy and Water Industries, in 1998 about 700 MUs 
served end consumers in their municipalities with electricity1. Being monopolists in their 
regions, the MUs became bureaucratic organizations, ultimately deviating from the original 
purpose of serving the citizens’ wellbeing. As the head of a MU customer center (established 
in 2001, before it was called the billing division of the commerce department) who joined the 
company in 1995 told us: 
“During the first years that I have worked here, the customers approached us… It was 
only possible to get energy from us… It was very different here. It was more an 
                                                            
1 Besides the cross-regional, regional utilities and MUs, the population of electricity suppliers includes also a 
small number of cooperatives and private firms, usually of small size. 
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 administration of customers. Actually, a kind of billing center. Such things like consulting 
services for the customers… did not exist. They were called energy-takers, not customers.” 
In 1996, EU introduced the Electricity Directive aiming to build an internal electricity 
market. Following this directive, the member states started to deregulate their national 
electricity market swithin the next 2 years. In contrast to all other member states which prefer 
to open their markets stepwise, Germany decided to open its electricity market to 100% 
competition at once in 1998, meaning that all end customers, including industries, businesses 
and households, could purchase electricity from any supplier in the market. 
Before the deregulation started, following the economic logic, many experts had 
expected a high mortality rate among the municipal utilities because electricity is a market of 
homogeneous good with strong economies of scale. Since 1998, the market concentration 
increased considerably (German Monopoly Commission, 2007) as a result of the following 
processes.  From 1998 to 2002, the “Big Eight” merged to “Big Four”(E.ON, RWE, EnBW 
and Vattenfall)  and their operations spread nationwide (thereafter NWU). The growth of 
dominant organizations in the market center (concentration) comes at the expense of the 
regional utilities. Out of the 80 regional utilities existed in 1998, 34 have totally disappeared 
into the corporate structures of the “Big Four”. The “Big Four” control also several regional 
utilities through majority shareholding, either directly or indirectly (e.g., through their local 
subsidiaries). In other words, more than half of regional utilities existed before deregulation 
became either totally or partially part of the NWU. The perishing of the regional utilities was 
sealed in 2002 by the merger of the trade association for the regional utilities with that for the 
NWU into the Association of Supra-regional and Regional Utilities (VRE in German), which 
subsequently merged into BDEW in 2007. However, at the same time, the expected wide 
death of the MUs did not take place (Die Welt, 2003). According to the trade association for 
MUs, the aggregated market share of all MUs in retailing actually increased from about 33% 
in 1997 to roughly 40% in 2006 (VKU, 2007). This unexpected outcome has puzzled the 
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 experts, regulators and even some MUs. Obviously, economic logic alone cannot explain 
what happened. I  expect that the identity mechanism of resource partitioning theory may 
shed new light on this puzzle. 
1.3 MAIN RESEARCH QUESITONS 
 Chapter 2: Identity Processes and Resource Partitioning 
 Several research gaps have motivated the research questions in chapter 2. First, 
increasing market concentration (e.g. Carroll, 1985) and competitive release (Hannan et al., 
2007) sets the ground for the flourishing of peripheral organizations, the emergence of a 
salient peripheral identity allows manifestation of durable market partitioning (Pólos et al., 
2010). Nonetheless, little is known about the conditions that favor the emergence and 
sustaining of such an identity oppositional to that of the market leaders (but see Carroll & 
Swaminathan 2000). In other words, is increasing market concentration a necessary but also a 
sufficient condition for resource partitioning based on identity? Second, as the consolidation 
of an identity requires reaching consensus (Hannan et al., 2007), both among producers and 
among audience members, such dynamics should be explored.  
In chapter 2, I explore the conditions that sustain market partitioning through the 
emergence of a collective identity of peripheral organizations which is oppositional to that of 
the market leaders. A competitive threat enacted by deregulation and increasing market 
concentration fuels the sense of common fate among peripheral players and sharpens 
categorical contrast. Specifically, I examine three boundary conditions determining the 
likelihood of success of an oppositional identity in triggering market partitioning: (i) the roles 
of heterogeneous preferences across audience segments in influencing the differentiated 
receptiveness upon producer identity claims; (ii) inter-firm cooperation serves to align the 
interests of peripheral organizations and to make the new identity salient to audience 
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 members; (iii) market partitioning hinges upon short delays in producer enacting as well as in 
audience perceiving the oppositional identity. To examine the process of identity-based 
partitioning, I design a formal model based on both theoretical arguments and qualitative 
evidence. To explore the boundary conditions, I conduct four simulation experiments. Each 
experiment generates hypotheses which can be tested empirically. This chapter also sets the 
stage for further theoretical development of identity-based partitioning in terms of both 
founding (chapter 3) and growth rates (chapter 4).  
 Chapter 3: Organizational Founding Rates and Identity-Based Resource Partitioning 
 Building on chapter 2, in chapter 3 I empirically examine the roles of heterogeneous 
audience preferences on partitioning through the lens of geography. Existing partitioning 
studies have largely focused on difference among producers (e.g. size, niche width), ignoring 
the differences in relation to the cognition and preferences of audience segments. Here, I 
consider geographical communities as the locus of preference formation and variation, 
following the suggestions of Hannan and colleagues (2007: 302-303). Moreover, recent 
theoretical development in organization ecology has identified four important dimensions of 
organizational identities: focus, contrast, resonance and empirical credibility (Baron, 2004; 
Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). A deeper understanding of identity-
based partitioning would require comprehensive understanding of the various identity 
dimensions. In this chapter, I focus on the latter three dimensions which are less explored. 
In chapter 3, I attempt to develop resource partitioning theory by studying the 
peripheral founding rates. I predict that the consolidation of an identity oppositional to that of 
dominant producers increases the founding rates of peripheral organizations. Moreover, I 
contend that the effects of market partitioning vary across audience segments: founding rates 
of peripheral organizations do increase in communities where the local audience tastes 
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 exhibit a greater resonance (or match) with the peripheral identity dimensions (localness, 
reliability and greenness) and may easily detect the empirical credibility of the peripheral 
identity.  
Chapter 4: Organizational Growth Rates and Identity-Based Resource Partitioning 
As in chapter 3, in chapter 4 I further explore the roles of heterogeneous audience 
preferences by focusing on the growth rates of both center and peripheral organizations upon 
the manifestation of competitive release. The choice to study growth rates is motivated by 
both a lack of partitioning studies on growth rates (but see Jaffee, 2001; Boone et al., 2002) 
and by Carroll and colleagues’s (2002) suggestion that dynamics of growth are both complex 
and interesting for theoretical development on resource partitioning. In addition, although 
competitive release has been recognized as the trigger for resource partitioning, there exists 
no direct empirical test on it. Furthermore, chapter 4 also applies the concepts of intrinsic 
appeal and engagement as developed by Hannan and colleagues (2007) to the study of 
resource partitioning.  
I contend that under resource release, although market center firms may absorb the 
majority of resources by acquiring the failed near-center producers, organizational growth 
rates of the peripheral firms will be higher than those of the center firms’ subsidiaries. 
Contrary to my prediction, greater match between organizational identity and the local 
audience tastes (intrinsic appeal) seems to impede organizational growth. Combining these 
results with the previous study which shows founding rates increase with greater match 
between identity and local tastes, I claim that identity-based resource partitioning unfolds 
both at the form level and at the firm level, depending on the strength of intrinsic appeal of 
the peripheral organizations.  
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 1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA  
 The present dissertation follows a research design combining both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence, attempting to gain a deeper and novel understanding of identity-based 
resource partitioning. Utilizing on the advantages of simulation methods in developing theory 
and generating hypotheses, chapter 2 relies on system dynamics approach to capture the 
dynamics of feedback process during identity-based partitioning. A formal model is built on 
both theoretical notions and field evidence. Both simulation experiments and qualitative data 
are relied on to generate hypotheses which can be tested in the follow-up empirical chapters 
(chapter 3 and 4). Building on chapter 2 and focusing on organizational founding rates, 
chapter 3 examines the effects of increasing perceived oppositional identities between the 
center and peripheral organizations on peripheral founding rates. This chapter also investigate 
the roles of the heterogeneous audience preferences in forms of geographical communities. 
Testable hypotheses are advanced using both theoretical narratives and extensive field data. 
Longitudinal quantitative data of the German electricity market from 1999 to 2009 is then 
used to test the hypotheses. Following chapter 3, chapter 4 further investigates the roles of the 
heterogeneous audience preferences in diverse geographical communities on organizational 
growth rates, applying the theoretical concepts of intrinsic appeal and engagement to study 
parititoning. This chapter also looks into the differentiated growth rates of both center and 
peripheral organizations. Similar to chapter 3, both theoretical narratives and extensive field 
data are used to develop testable hypotheses, which are then tested using longitudinal 
quantitative data of the German electricity market from 1998 to 2008. 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the empirical context, I have 
carried out extensive field work from 2008 to 2010. I conducted 11 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews, each lasting 1 to 2 hours. The interviewees include 6 MU managers and 
department chiefs as well as industry experts holding critical positions at the umbrella trade 
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 association (BDEW) and the MU trade association (VKU). Three informants have been 
interviewed twice. In addition, I also conducted a considerable number of informal interviews 
at industrial conferences and via telephone. Close interactions with the industry also enabled 
me good access to more systematic qualitative data and high quality quantitative data. 
Qualitative data provided by the two trade associations include the reports of the following 
surveys: (i) TNS Emnid survey (1999; 2003; 2005; 2009): The telephone surveys have been 
funded by VKU and carried out by TNS Emnid Market Research. The sample size for the 
year 1999, 2003 and 2005 is 500, for 2009 is 1000. (ii) ifm study (2006): This study has been 
funded by the umbrella trade association BDEW and conducted by ifm market research 
institute. The study consists of 60 in-depth interviews with household customers each lasting 
1.5 to 2 hours, carried out by professional psychologists. (iii) BDEW customer surveys 
(BDEW household customer survey, 1999-2009; BDEW commercial customer survey 2000-
2009): funded by BDEW and conducted by PROMIT Institut fuer Prognose, Marktforschung 
& Informationstechniken. The sample size is 1200 for household customers and 1040 for 
commercial customers from 13 business areas. In addition to all these, I also studied 
extensively the German trade press as well as the national and local newspaper articles. My 
understanding of the empirical context has helped me to better connect to the theories, 
finding appropriate empirical measures as well as interpreting the obtained simulation and 
empirical results.  
Besides the qualitative data mentioned, I also collected several sets of longitudinal 
quantitative data in order to test hypotheses in chapter 3 and 4. The four data sets used in 
chapter 3 are: (i) the number of peripheral organizational foundings in the 40 German 
districts over the period 1999-2009, based on BDEW data and my own collections; (ii) 
audience heterogeneity is mapped using the socio-demographic statistics of the 40 German 
districts from 1998 to 2008, collected from the German Federal Statistical Office Web Site; 
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 (iii) the measurement of the perceived oppositional identities relies on coding a German 
regional newspaper from 1999 to 2009; (iv) the measurement of the perceived empirical 
credibility of identity claims of the peripheral organizations follows my coding of a German 
national newspaper. The data sets used in chapter 4 include: (i) the annual electricity retail 
sales of both center and peripheral firm to end users in 1998 and from 2001 to 2008, based on 
BDEW data and my own collection. (ii) to account for audience heterogeneity, I collected 
data from the German Federal Statistical Office Web Site which contains the socio-
demographic statistics of the 439 counties in Germany from 1997 to 2007. (iii) the 
measurement of engagement relies on information on MU cooperation activities, based on 
data of BDEW and VKU, as well as my own collection.  
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 Chapter 2 
Identity Processes and Resource Partitioning 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A substantial consensus does exist among organizational theorists concerning markets 
as socially constructed entities supported by beliefs systems that provide meaning and 
substance to their characterizing features, such as costs, revenues or demand (White, 1981; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hannan et al., 2007). Recent theoretical developments within 
organization ecology point to the emergence of organizational identities as the mechanism 
through which the cognitive boundaries of markets are delineated (see Hannan, 2010). 
Identities, being sets of social codes or features that define a schema, facilitate 
commensuration (Espeland & Stevens, 1998), and crystallize the expectations of audience 
members concerning the range of legitimate behaviors (Pólos et al., 2002).    
Research concerning resource partitioning has recently endorsed this view in its effort 
to explain the emergence of market segmentation (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). Incepted 
more than two decades ago (Carroll, 1985), resource partitioning aims at studying the process 
through which an increasing dominance of large generalist organizations is combined with 
the proliferation of small specialists. According to the original version of the theory, markets 
get partitioned as scale based competition among generalists leads to the release of resources 
in favor of specialists. Empirical supports for such a theory has been obtained from a wide 
variety of industries such as telephone, cooperative banking, airline, beer brewing, wine 
making, newspaper, auditing and car manufacturing (see Carroll et al., 2002). Recent 
developments advanced by Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) indicate that market partitioning 
may unfold in presence of distinct identities among generalists and specialists.  
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 Notwithstanding the qualitative and quantitative evidence in support of identity as one 
of the key mechanisms underlying market partitioning, several questions remain unexplored. 
First, although competitive release sets the ground for the flourishing of peripheral 
organizations, the emergence of a distinct and coherent identity among such organizations 
allows the manifestation of durable market partitioning (Pólos et al., 2010). Nonetheless, not 
much is known about the conditions that favor the emergence and sustain the existence of an 
identity oppositional to that of market leaders (but see Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). 
Second, as the consolidation of an organizational identity requires the creation of consensus, 
both among producers and among audience members, such dynamics should be explored.  
In the present chapter I build on the theoretical insights of both resource partitioning 
and organizational identity research and aim of improving our understanding of processes of 
market partitioning based on identity differences among producers. First, it is essential to 
investigate the conditions that sustain the emergence of an identity oppositional to that of 
market leaders. In particular, the process through which collective identities are enacted by 
local organizations in opposition to the further penetration of large players appear essential to 
this end (Hannan, 1979). Second, as for the likelihood of success of an oppositional identity 
in triggering market partitioning I will explore three general boundary conditions: (i) the 
manifestation of cooperation among peripheral players; (ii) the role of heterogeneous 
preferences across audience segments; and (iii) the relevance of delays for the buffering of 
peripheral organizations from market leaders. In all such cases I will provide evidence about 
the conditions under which the identity-based market partitioning may be deterred.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I create a formal model of my 
arguments, based on both theoretical notions and field evidence. In the main part of the 
chapter, the analysis of the simulation results serves as a steppingstone to develop a set of 
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 propositions. In the final part, I discuss the contributions and limitations of the study, present 
a generalized model and provide suggestions for future research.  
2.2 THE MODEL 
In this section, I present my argument in form of a dynamic theory with multiple 
feedback loops. I proceed in two steps. In the first step, I formalize the model according to an 
economic reasoning. In the second step, I will proceed by adding a few layers of complexity 
into the model, drawing from research on organizational identities. This latter  specification 
of the model will be defended link-by-link with reference to theoretical concepts.  
Economies of scale cause market concentration. High market concentration increases 
the size of large firms, enabling them to reap scale economies and supply products at lower 
costs than their smaller competitors, driving them out of the market. As a result of that, they 
manage to acquire even more market share and growing even larger in size, further boosting 
market concentration. 
FIGURE 2-1 
Model with purely economic mechanism 
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 The feedback loop diagram reported in Figure 2-1 summarizes the causal structure of 
the reinforcing process outlined before. In the empirical setting, the nationwide utilities 
(NWU) represent the large firms; and the municipal utilities (MU) represent the smaller firms. 
The reinforcing effect is true for both industrial/commercial customers (thereafter IC) and 
household customers (thereafter HC) with the strength of the effect varying depending on 
price sensitivity of customers. In the figure the arrows indicate the presence of a causal 
connection between variables. The “+” sign besides the arrows meaning two variables 
moving in the same direction and the “-” sign for moving in the opposite directions and. For 
example, the   “-” sign between “market concentration NMU” and “price NWU” means that 
the higher the market concentration of the large NWU, the lower the price they are able to 
offer for their products2. The sign placed in the center of a loop specify the polarity of the 
whole loop (Sterman, 2000). In this case, both are positive (or reinforcing) loops, and I 
expect to observe increasing concentration and mass exit of MUs. 
For simplicity and consistency, this first-stage model shows only NWUs and MUs. 
But this economic model can also be applied to explain the demise of the regional utilities. 
As the smaller generalists occupying near-center positions, their overlap with NWUs turned 
out to be greater than that between NWUs and MUs. Thus the regional utilities were exposed 
to more intensive competition from the NWUs, which led to their downfall. Indeed, it is such 
a process of competitive release that removed a powerful constraint on MU organizations and 
set the ground for the partitioning of the market (Hannan et al., 2007: 209- 228).  
To explain the seemingly counterintuitive outcome - the widely expected but never 
realized large scale MU mortality, I argue that another process based on organizational 
                                                            
2 Whether increasing market concentration lead to price increases or to decreases may be debated. Nonetheless, 
one of the necessary conditions of resource partitioning is the existence of economies of scale and of scale-based 
competition among generalists – i.e., scale advantages of larger generalists and falling prices. Some evidence 
demonstrates that this narrative is consistent with what happened in this sector during the years 1999-2000. The 
price for electricity dropped about 10% from April 1999 to August 2000 (Federal Statistical Office Germany, 
2004). In some cases, prices paid by big business have fallen by up to 60 per cent (Atkins and Taylor, 1999).  
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 identities has balanced the effects of market concentration. A balancing loop inspired by 
research on organizational identities is thus added to the reinforcing economic loop. Figure 2-
2 shows the complete model specification. Below, I explain the ‘identity loop’ link by link.  
FIGURE 2-2 
Complete model with economic argument and identity 
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Research demonstrates that a competitive threat by powerful market actors can lead 
organizations to engage in collective actions (Hannan, 1979; Hawley, 1986). According to 
Hawley, members of a population, when confronted with a common threat, may engage in 
uniform actions and easily reach consensus on the rules, the procedures and the sanctions that 
allow them to defend their territory (1986: 37). In a similar vein, Hannan (1979: 255-256) 
argued that ethnic organizations are likely to activate a collective identity once modern 
mainstream centers penetrate local communities. Because of the disparity of power among 
actors, mobilization in opposition to further expansions by the center is carried out by 
enacting a supra-local identity of a scale comparable to that of the rivals.  
Recent research carried out by Negro and his colleagues (2007) in the 
Barolo/Barbaresco region leads to the same conclusion. As the authors put it “the salience of 
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 collective identity gets amplified by the oppositional contrast of categories. The success of 
modernism activated traditional identities and fueled countermobilization” (Negro et al., 2007: 
4). Similarly, according to Ingram and Yue (2008), alike organizations are likely to cooperate 
and recognize the existence of a common identity in presence of a salient out-group. The 
common features of the focal group (in-group) may become more salient in presence of 
“others” (out-group) with contrasting features are introduced. The same process may be at 
work to re-establish a dormant collective identity and to strengthen it. Ingram and McEvily 
(2007), for instance, demonstrate that a salient rival contributes to sharpen and amplify the 
collective identities of existing organizational forms. I argue the perceived similarity and the 
alignment of intents among group members increases with level of cooperation among them. 
Indeed, experimental research shows that the interaction among group members has been 
proven to enhance consensus (Haslam et al., 1998).  
In the empirical setting, the perceived threat stems from two related sources: the rise 
of a salient rival (NWUs) reflected in increasing market concentration which is triggered by 
the sudden environmental change (i.e., deregulation). Deregulation not only propelled the ex-
monopolists into a new business and regulatory environment with considerably higher risks 
(Larsen & Bunn, 1999), but also set off the process of market consolidation and enabled the 
rise of the powerful NWUs. Remember also that an important pre-condition for engaging in 
collective action is the recognition of a set of common interests. Facing the threat from the 
NWUs, the MUs came to realize the value of broadcasting an oppositional identity. 
Collective action turned out to be facilitated by extensive cooperation. Information exchange, 
knowledge sharing, indeed are facilitated upon the recognition of a common identity and at 
the same time, served to the develop a more contrasting and crisp identity of MUs. Needless 
to say, it may take some time for the MUs to start engaging with audience members.  
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 A collective MU identity revives however only if the producers’ claims are perceived 
and accepted by audience members( i.e., the identity possesses intrinsic appeal in the eyes of 
audience members). Indeed, audiences cluster producers together and exhibit consensus 
around the social codes that define their identity (see Hannan et al., 2007). As in the case of 
producers, it takes time for also audience members to perceive, evaluate and endorse the MUs 
offering. As stated before, the NWUs are able to deliver electricity at lower prices than the 
MUs because of economies of scale. Customer segments may be argued to be heterogeneous 
because of a different price sensitivity. For customer segment with lower price sensitivity, 
they might find MU identity embedded in local community more appealing relative to the 
price gap. For customer segment with higher price sensitivity, even though they perceive the 
MU identity, they might still decide to switch to NWU because the price gap is more crucial 
for them. In other words, it is the trade-off between price gap and perceived identity strength 
which influence the attachment of customers to the MUs. Qualitative evidence demonstrates 
that relying both on economic and identity-related considerations allows to develop a realistic 
representation of this market (see also VDEW, 2005; German Monopoly Commission, 2007).  
Simulation Design 
During the last decade, simulation has increasingly been used in organizational studies 
as a method for testing and developing theory (e.g. Lomi & Larsen, 2001; Davis et al., 2007; 
Harrison et al., 2007). And “a computer simulation can take a complex set of assumptions, 
simulate a set of organizational processes, and represent the implications of these processes 
for organizational outcomes” (Lant, 1994: 195).  A particular useful way to employ this 
methodology to develop theory is to set up a series of virtual experiments where the 
simulation is used as the observation generating mechanism (Larsen & Lomi, 2002).  
We chose to use a system dynamics approach because it is particular suitable for 
capturing the dynamics of feedback process and considering the time aspect (Davis et al., 
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 2007; Sterman, 2000). The results that I report were obtained by using numerical integration 
(Euler method with a fixed step) and implemented in Vensim, a software package designed 
for system dynamics simulation (Ventana Systems, 2007). To simulate the model I translate 
the models in Figure 2-1 and 2-2 into differentiation equations. The equations are presented 
in Appendix A and the numerical values in Appendix B. Numerical values are not based 
directly on empirical values.   
I structure the simulation experiments in the following way. I begin by establishing a 
base case. This is the case against which I judge the following experiments. The role of the 
base case is to provide evidence that the model captures the behavior that the theory predicts 
and that the model presentation is credible. I then perform a number of experiments to further 
explore the implication of the model in order to develop hypotheses (Davis et al., 2007). 
Table 2-1 provides a brief explanation of the base case and the series of experiments as well 
as the link between them.  
TABLE 2-1 
Simulation design 
Base case and 
experiments 
Explanation 
Base case Compare the behavior of the two models: (1) the model based on economic argument; 
(2) the complete model based on both economic argument and identity 
Experiment 1 Investigate the implication of varying levels of the external threat (environmental shift) 
on the organizational behavior (cooperation among MUs) 
Experiment 2 Investigate the implication of varying levels of price sensitivity on fitness of MUs 
(market share)  
Experiment 3 Investigate the implication of varying lengths of two delays on fitness of MUs (market 
share): (1) the producer side delay in cooperation; (2) the audience side delay in 
perceiving identity claim of MUs 
Experiment 4 Combine experiment 1 and 2 to investigate the interaction effect between external 
threat and the two delays 
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 We conducted these experiments based on the following theoretical considerations. 
My interest lies in processes of partitioning based on organizational identity. Instead of 
modeling demographic rates (e.g., entries and exits) I prefer to model variations in market 
shares as more consistent with the empirical context analyzed. Experiment 1 investigates the 
determinants of the emergence of an oppositional identity with particular reference to 
environmental disruption (i.e., deregulation) and of the competitive threat (i.e., powerful 
rivals), namely the two sources of threat to MUs. Experiment 2 taps into issues of audience 
heterogeneity by looking into the effects of price sensitivity. Experiment 3 scrutinizes the role 
of delays – both on the side of producers and of audiences -- for market partitioning. 
Experiment 4 combines Experiment 1 and 3. It explores the interaction between the 
competitive threat due to deregulation and delays. In every experiment I rely on qualitative 
evidence to support the experimental choices (Harrison et al., 2007). 
2.3 SIMULATION RESULTS AND PROPOSITIONS 
Base Run- Partitioning of the Market Segments Based on Identity 
In the base line specification, I compare the behavior of the model based on economic 
reasoning with the complete model after activating the identity loop and demonstrating that 
the model captures the behavior predicted by resource partitioning.  
Observing Figure 2-3a on the HC of MUs, I can see that in case of purely economic 
logic based on economies of scale and price difference (“without identity”), MU lose more 
than 70% of their HC within just ten simulation periods. Such loss continues and drives the 
market share of MU in HC segment close to zero. The MUs’ loss of market share in IC 
segment is even more dramatic. The results reflect the sensitivity of customers to price 
differences between the MU and NWU where the IC have higher price sensitivity, which is 
the reason why they “defect” the MU faster than the HC. The results illustrate the market 
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 evolution under conditions of rapid growth of the NWUs with the MUs being driven out of 
the market, as predicted by many before the deregulation. 
FIGURE 2-3a 
Base run- MU market in HC segment 
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FIGURE 2-3b 
Base run- MU market share in IC segment 
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The two lines labeled as “with identity” in Figure 2-3a and 2-3b show the market 
evolution after activating the identity loop. As I can see, significant changes are observed 
both in the HC and in the IC segment. In the HC segment (Figure 2-3a),  after ten periods, 
MUs lose only 25% of their HC and their market share stabilizes at about 20% from the 30th 
period – a results sharply different from the continuous loss observed before. Similarly, in the 
IC segment (Figure 2-3b), MUs’ identity serve to stabilizes the MU market share, reflecting 
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 the prediction of the resource partitioning theory. The results replicate the emergence of a 
stable equilibrium predicted by resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985).  
FIGURE 2-3c 
Base run- evolution of MU collective identity 
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The remarkable differences in the two cases demonstrate the effect of the collective 
identity of the MUs in counterbalancing the reinforcing loop of the economic logic. Figure 2-
3c displays the unfolding of the collective identity strength of the MUs. It continuously 
increases during the first 40 periods and then stabilizes at a relatively high level. This 
development is in accordance with and also the reason for the differences shown in Figure 2-
3 and 2-4.  
Experiment 1- Environmental Disruption and Competitive Threat 
In this experiment I test the effects of environmental disruption (deregulation) and 
competitive threat (market concentration) on the intensity of MU cooperation. As 
deregulation triggered  market concentration, I conduct this experiment by varying the degree 
of environmental disruption. As the only EU member state to deregulate its electricity market 
in one step, the external threat that MU’s perceived in the German electricity market was 
substantial. Qualitative evidence confirms my  expectation. As the marketing manager of a 
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 MU, a member of the MU cooperation group “Local Energy” which is established in 1999, 
told me during an interview: 
“We were totally unprepared… Although we had studied a lot about (deregulations in) 
telecommunication and (electricity deregulation) in other countries, UK, North 
Europe…. Uncertainty prevailed. As the first newcomers came to the market, for 
example, Yello (a subsidiary of a NWU). We were totally flustered … (laugh). Then 
very quickly, we formed with other municipal utilities, hmm, let me say, our Yello-
rival association…3” 
 
Another informant told me how they worked in the cooperation to recognize and to 
revive their distinct collective identity, which has become less sharp during the long 
monopoly years: 
“we have thought, in the cooperation Local Energy, for a long time, in the branding 
board meeting, which features do we as MUs sell, which unique features do we 
have… we have tried.. you know the master plan method? You write down your 
thoughts on  pieces of paper, and pin them on the board. It is not simple at all to make 
clear what do we do more than a supplier located very far (from here). You must also 
make this clear to your own work forces. This search and adjustment process, so that 
we are aware of our features, and special features. If this is not clear, then we are, I 
think, we are then moving away from customers. But this we have to communicate (to 
our work forces). We conduct, since several years, we conduct training for our work 
forces (in customer center).”   
MUs realized the value of enacting a collective identity oppositional to that of NWUs. 
MU stand for “citizen value instead of shareholder value” (Zeitung für kommunale 
Wirtschaft, 2008). The mission of the MUs and the municipal cooperation groups should be 
“the development of the local economic and living environment for a strong and worth-living 
region… strengthening the economic independent future of the municipal enterprises in a 
changing energy market”, according to the mission statement of KOS- a cooperation group 
of 14 municipal utilities from Upper Bavaria and Swabia (KOS Web site). Many municipal 
utilities understood that it was necessary to distance themselves from the “Big Four” because 
they “have a fundamentally different organizational philosophy and mission”, as the 
chairman of the Land Rheinland-Pfalz group of the municipal utilities trade association 
                                                            
3 Though the formal deregulation started in 1998, many MUs started to perceive the competitive pressure in 
1999 as Yello (a subsidiary of EnBW, one of the Big Four) and some other newcomers entered the market with 
federal wide marketing campaigns.  
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 (VKU) suggested (Zeitung für kommunale Wirtschaft, 2007a). Thus, in a market dominated 
by the a few giants, the municipal cooperation groups see themselves as “Robin Hood against 
the Big Four” (Zeitung für kommunale Wirtschaft, 2006a). 
To mimic the disruptive nature of the change, I add a step function (a sudden change) 
to the base model with step height varying from 0.05 to 0.15. Figure 2-4 illustrates the 
trajectories of the level of MUs’ cooperate as a function of varying level of environmental 
change (step height). As the environmental disruption increases, market concentration climbs, 
and cooperation among MUs intensifies as well. And higher cooperation improves the market 
share for MUs as shown by Figure 2-5. Note that even though cooperation tends to converge 
after some periods (see Figure 2-4), starting from a higher cooperation level is vital for 
retaining more customers (see Figure 2-5). Based on this reasoning, I propose the following 
hypothesis. 
FIGURE 2-4 
The effect of competitive threat on MU cooperation 
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 FIGURE 2-5 
The effect of competitive threat on MU market share in HC segment 
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Hypothesis 1. The greater the competitive threat, the more MUs will cooperate. 
Experiment 2- Price Sensitivity and Identity Salience  
Cooperation among MUs contributes to sharpen the identity of such organizations and 
facilitates collective sense-making and the emergence of consensus. In this experiment, I look 
into how the effects of price sensitivity and identity salience may induce market segmentation. 
This leads to diverging growth patterns of the MU and NWU in different audience segments 
and the partitioning of the market. Figure 2-6 shows the different trajectories of MUs’ market 
share in HC customer segment as a function of price sensitivity of HC (varying from -0.4 to -
1) by fixing the price sensitivity of IC at -1 as in the base run.  I can observe that as the HC 
becomes more price sensitive, the MUs manage to retain fewer HC and have lower market 
share. The experiment concerning the IC customer segment as a function of price sensitivity 
(not shown here) displays a trend similar to that of Figure 2-6. 
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 FIGURE 2-6 
The effect of HC price sensitivity on MU market share in HC segment  
(with IC price sensitivity fixed at -1) 
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Evidences show that a combination of high price sensitivity for IC and low price 
sensitivity for HC is a realistic assumption (German Monopoly Commission, 2007). Note that 
the different price sensitivity of IC and HC is closely related to their different appreciation for 
MU identities. The line labeled “sensitivity= -0.4” (meaning HC price sensitivity= -0.4) in 
Figure 2-6 shows such a combination with price sensitivity of IC fixed at the level of -1. As 
the process starts, MUs’ market share in both HC and IC segment is 30%. In other words, the 
customers of MU consists of 50% HC and 50% IC. After about 40 periods, the market share 
of MU stabilizes at about 20% in HC segment and roughly 10% in IC segment. That is to say, 
the customers of MU now consists of 2/3 of HC and 1/3 of IC. HCs are less price sensitive 
and more appreciative to MU’s identity. Therefore, as cooperation among MUs intensifies, 
their collective identity is sharpened and strengthened, resulting in a split of customer 
segments: HC more attached to MUs and IC more attached to NWUs.  
Qualitative evidences provides support the simulation results. A survey conducted by 
the trade association shows that the household customers clearly distinguish between “Our 
Municipal Utilities” and “the Big Ones”, and are not price sensitive up to a certain range (8 
Euros/month) if the price difference can be argued reasonably such as the MUs’ engagements 
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 for the common wellbeing of the locals (VDEW, 2005). A more recent survey shows that 56% 
of the household customers prefer to have their electricity supplied by MUs, whereas only 25% 
would like to buy electricity from private firms. The same survey indicates also that 60% of 
the Germans wish that energy and water supply, public transportation and waste management 
remain in the hand of MUs (Zeitung für kommunale Wirtschaft, 2008).  Attempts to privatize 
the MUs were perceived by the citizens as “selling off family silver”, some sparked off 
citizen referendums or even demonstrations as happened in Erlangen (Erlangen city web site), 
Steinheim (North Rhine-Westphalia Interior Ministry web site), Düsseldorf (Energie & 
Management, 2001) and Leipzig (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2008). The customers clearly 
recognize the different strategies and identities of the large companies and the MUs. A survey 
reveals that the citizens associate MUs with “common welfare orientation”, “support for the 
region”, “environmental friendly behavior4”, and “good value for money. In contrast, the big 
four electricity suppliers are associated with “profit seeking”, “flexibility”, and “customer 
orientation” (Zeitung für kommunale Wirtschaft, 2008). Especially at home, MUs enjoy 
considerable sympathy, as the marketing chief of a MU told us: 
“We MUs have realized that we have a home bonus by our customers here… There 
are customers, who would like to drink a coffee with us or just to complain about 
something, simply to have time for them. Some customers say I only talk to Ms. XXX 
(in the customer center). Like I said last time to my colleagues, we have the house 
keys of some of our customers (laugh)... So it is these personal relationships, the 
personal interactions, and to have time for customers and talk with them. This is, say, 
very important.” 
 
However, the same attachment and loyalty is unlikely to be expected in the IC 
segment. Especially the largest industrial and commercial customers operating federal wide 
                                                            
4 A related issue concerns whether the customer loyalty to MUs is due to their preferences for green energy or 
their attachment to MUs’ local identity. Indeed, the share of green energy in total electricity generation has 
increased from less than 5% in 1998 to about 15% in 2008 (BDEW, 2009). Nonetheless, green energy remains a 
niche product. Thus its contribution to MUs’ success was limited. Moreover, both the NWU and the newcomers 
provide green electricity products.     
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 or even internationally with little attachment to the local communities, are the first ones to 
leave their MUs. The marketing chief of another MU told us: 
“There was, immediately in 1998, a (demand) bundling tendency. Many (industrial or 
commercial) customers told us, we cannot buy (electricity) from you anymore, 
because our parent companies do this for all. We had this (situation) with the 
(German) Telecom, (German) Railway, and large chain stores. There we could not do 
anything. Some were (customers with) large amount.” 
Building on the simulation results and the qualitative evidence collected, I derive the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: As MU cooperation increases, MUs will exhibit higher growth rate in 
market share in the HC segment than in the IC one. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: As MU cooperation increases, the NWUs will exhibit higher growth 
rate in market share in the IC segment than in the HC one. 
Experiment 3- The Role of Delays 
In this experiment I examine the implication of varying lengths of delays on market 
partitioning, reflected in the change of MU’s market share. As mentioned before, there are 
two kinds of delays in the model. The first one concerns the delay with which producers 
recognize and make claims of their collective identity; the second regards the delay of 
audience members in perceiving, evaluating and accepting the MUs identity claims.  
FIGURE 2-7 
The effect of producer side delay in cooperation on MU market share in HC segment 
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 Figure 2-7 illustrates the behavior pattern of the MUs’ market share in HC segment 
as a function of the producer side delay. The length of delay ranges from 1 to 100 periods. A 
short delay time implies that the MUs quickly reach consensus about their common foes, 
their oppositional collective identity as well as the cooperative strategies. A long delay means 
that it takes time until consensus is reached and collective actions are organized. This should 
have impact on the process of market partitioning. As I can see in Figure 2-7, with increasing 
delay, MUs lose more customers and have lower market share. For the German MUs, I 
expect that the delays in cooperation tend to be short rather than long. This is so for various 
reasons. The most important of them is that the MUs identity appeared intrinsically appealing 
to HC customers and just needed engagement to be re-activated. The pre-existence of a 
shared identity (albeit latent), facilitated the perception of a common cause and an intensive 
communication among peers. Indeed, MUs were described as animals of the same species by 
Trianel, a successful federal wide MU cooperation group founded in 1999 (Trianel, 2007):  
Metaphor 1: “Flying in swarm, the air resistance is reduced and the ascending force 
is improved. In this way, a group of migratory birds can master together a distance of 
thousands of kilometers.  
Lessons learned: “Reaching goals in sole attempts can mean unnecessary costs. 
When 
strengths and complementary interests are bundled in groups, the competitiveness of 
each single party is increased, enabling them to survive in difficult environment.” 
…. 
Metaphor 4: “Delphins herd in loose groups, and they live and hunt together. As 
highly intelligent animals they coordinate their behavior in different situations through 
intensive communication with each other. “ 
Lessons learned: “Common goals and intensive communication among members in a 
cooperation network are crucial for the functioning of the group.” 
 
Preexisting industrial infrastructures and networks such as trade associations can also 
accelerate the “speed” of cooperation. For example, the previously mentioned cooperation 
group “Local Energy” with the MUs from the two East German federal states was established 
in September 1999, only one month after Yello started its federal wide customer acquisition. 
My informant told me that because the managers of the MUs had already working 
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 relationships with each other before the deregulation, it was natural to collaborate on a 
marketing campaign under the common brand “Local Energy” in September 1999 in both 
federal states. 
 
FIGURE 2-8 
The effect of audience side delay in perception on MU market share in HC segment 
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Figure 2-8 shows the paths of the MUs’ market share in HC segment as a function of 
the audience side delay in perceiving, evaluating, attaining consensus and reacting to the 
MU’s identity claims. Two main factors can affect the speed at which MU identity becomes 
salient to audience members: the perceived similarity among producers and the categorical 
contrast with market leaders. Similarity among the MUs can be enhanced by their interaction 
and cooperation, and categorical contrast to the NWUs increases with market concentration 
(i.e., with the demise of regional utilities). Needless to say, greater similarity among MUs and 
larger contrast to NWUs promotes consensus and generally shortens the audience side delay 
in endorsing the MUs identity claims. As Figure 2-8 illustrates the effect of the audience side 
delays appear similar to that concerning producer side delays. The results in Figure 2-7 and 2-
8 illustrate the importance of time and speed in the co-evolutionary processes that leads to the 
emergence of the MUs collective identity and therefore to market partitioning.  
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 Based on the above arguments, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a. The shorter the MUs delay in cooperating, the higher their market 
share.    
 
Hypothesis 3b. The shorter the audience side delay in perceiving the MUs identity 
claim, the higher the market share of the MUs.  
Experiment 4- Combine Threats and Delays 
The final experiment combines Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, aiming to explore the 
interaction effect between the environmental disruption, the competitive threat, and the two 
delays. As stated before, in this setting, the threat due to deregulation is substantial, the 
competitive threat resulted from concentration as well, and the producer side delay tends to 
be short. In the following results presented, the level of competitive threat is fixed at a high 
level (step height = 0.25) and producer side delay is set to be short (=1.5 period), I then vary 
the length of the audience side delay. 
FIGURE 2-9 
MUs’ market share in HC segment with large external threat (=0.25), a short producer side 
delay in cooperation (=1.5) and varying audience side delay (1.5 to 15) 
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Figure 2-9 shows that, if the environmental disruption (and the competitive threat it 
engenders) is sufficiently high and the producer side delay is short, it is possible for the MUs 
to gain market share and also stabilize at a large market share. However, as the audience side 
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 delay increases, the model behavior exhibits oscillations. The longer the audience side delay, 
the more violent is the oscillation. Why is this? The combination of short producer side delay 
and long audience side delay means that while the MUs are quick in reacting to the threat, the 
audience is slow in perceiving their claims. If audience is slow in perceiving the identity 
claim, MUs will base their judgment and strategy adjustment on the lagged information. Thus, 
producers tend to over- or under-react, leading to oscillatory behavior. This evidence points 
to the co-evolutionary nature of the identity emerging process governed by the interaction 
and the feedback relations between producer and audience. I believe that significant 
oscillation will likely make further cooperation unsustainable, damage the collective identity 
and harm the participant organizations. Therefore, I hold the outcome with gaining market 
share at a stable level as the most ideal outcome for the MUs. 
Notice that this ideal outcome cannot be produced either in the base run or the 
previous experiments. In the base run, MUs only manage to stabilize after losing some initial 
market share. In Experiment 1, if the level of environmental disruption increases, while 
keeping both delays as in the base line specification (= 5), MUs manage to gain market share, 
but always with some oscillation. In Experiment 3, with no sudden environmental disruption 
(step hight= 0), even when I cut both delays very short, the MUs never gain market share, 
only lose less customers. Due to space limitation, I do not report these runs graphically. In 
summary, MUs can have good and steady performance only if (i) the environmental 
disruption is sufficiently high and (ii) both producer side delay in cooperation and audience 
side delay in perception are equally short. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: MUs will gain market share when confronted with a substantial threat 
and both the producer and the audience side delay are short. 
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 2.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Inspired by the limitations of existing research on market partitioning (Carroll, 1985; 
Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000) and drawing on research on organizational identities (Hannan 
et al., 2007), I designed a formal model and conducted four simulation experiments to 
improve our understanding of the processes of identity-based partitioning. Each experiment 
generated hypotheses which can be tested empirically. The results obtained explicate the 
conditions that sustain an identity oppositional to that of market leaders. The sharpness of the 
broadcasted identity, as well as the relative receptiveness of audience members to its 
associated claims, significantly affect the likelihood of market partitioning.       
The results obtained from the models extend resource partitioning theory in several 
ways. First, while the original formulation of partitioning (Carroll, 1985) relied on structural 
inertia, the results indicate that oppositional identities may lead to market partitioning as well. 
The process through which an oppositional identity is claimed and becomes crisp in the eyes 
of audience members is detailed in the simulation model and supported by qualitative 
evidence. Second, and related, I explore this process with specific reference three boundary 
conditions: (i) cooperation among peripheral organizations, (ii) audience heterogeneity and 
(iii) timing. This research suggests that intense cooperation and substantial heterogeneity in 
preferences is needed to observe market partitioning. Concerning timing, how quickly 
audience perceives the identity claim and to which extent this delay is coordinated with that 
on the side of producers, appears important as well. Upon a competitive threat, short delays 
both on the producer and the audience side will allow MUs to gain steady market share. 
Conversely, long delays postpone the emergence of the oppositional identity. As  the latter 
serves to buffer peripheral organizations from the competitive strength of market leaders, 
market partitioning turned out to be deterred (for a similar logic see Pólos et al., 2010). Third, 
this study extends the applicability of resource partitioning to markets with homogeneous 
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 products. I have shown that the existence of different identities may lead to market 
partitioning, even in case of commodity products. In doing so, I contribute to shift the focus 
of resource partitioning theory from economic arguments to sociological and cultural ones.  
The results obtained by the models provide novel insights to research on 
organizational identities as providing structure to markets and meanings to the actions of the 
organizations operating therein (White, 1981; Hannan et al., 2007). Recent work in 
organizational ecology, suggests that categorical contrast (i.e., the degree to which the 
members of a population appear similar one to the other and at the same time different from 
other organizations belonging to different domains) provides legitimacy to an organizational 
form (for a review see Hannan, 2010). An increasing number of studies demonstrate that 
upon the emergence of contrast organizations are rewarded for displaying clear, unambiguous 
identities (e.g., Hsu, 2006; Hsu et al., 2009; Zuckerman, 1999; Ruef & Patterson, 2009; 
Negro et al., 2007). But where does contrast come from? Most of the existing research treats 
categories as exogenous and pre-existing to the action of organizations. In the present case 
market deregulation is an exogenous trigger of contrast. Two possible exceptions to this 
general trend are the articles of Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) and that of Rao and his 
colleagues (2005). Notwithstanding the insights of this research, it is fair to say that the 
processes through which new identities emerge – so central to improve our comprehension of 
the dynamics of markets -- remains greatly underexplored. No doubts, I agree that market 
concentration is likely to increase categorical contrast (Hannan et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the 
results of the simulation experiments indicate that an exogenous shock is just a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the success of an oppositional identity: cooperation is needed to 
align the efforts of peripheral organizations and, thus, to sharpen their collective identity. 
Needless to say, more evidence is needed to support the claims advanced here.   
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 Three general scope conditions apply to the present chapter. The existence of a 
sufficient threat to enact collective actions represents the first scope condition under which 
the model apply. I backed up my claims by relying on existing research (Hawley, 1986; 
Hannan, 1979; Negro et al., 2007; Ingram & Yue, 2008). Deregulation was interpreted as the 
competitive threat that activates the ‘identity loop’. Nonetheless, other kind of changes such 
as transformation of customer tastes, economic recession and amendments of industrial 
standards may serve to the same purpose as well. The second scope condition is that the 
market players should fit into different identities or follow opposite logics. It is necessary that 
market leaders are perceived as a salient common enemy against which peripheral 
organizations engage in collective actions. The conditions under which this strategy becomes 
feasible should be further explored. The last scope condition pertains to the different price 
sensitivity of customer segments. The joint effect of different price sensitivity and 
receptiveness to the identity claim triggers divergent attachment to organizations. While price 
differences are informative here about heterogeneous preferences, the same may not be true 
in other empirical contexts. No doubts, a nuanced knowledge of the context may be needed to 
nail down the relevant dimension of heterogeneity for the specific audience investigated. 
Do these scope conditions imply that this model tailored to the German electricity 
market is hardly generalizable to other contexts? To the contrary, I believe that it can be 
generalized to other settings as well, such as beer brewing (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000) or 
radio broadcasting (Pozner & Rao, 2006; Greve et al., 2006). The generalized model (Figure 
2-10) is developed by preserving the structure of the model presented in Figure 2-2.  
The inner reinforcing loop summarizes the reinforcing economic argument in figure 
2-2, only at a more abstract level. Increasing market concentration resulted from the 
decimating of  the near center organizations  (smaller generalists). With the perishing of the 
near center organizations, the perceived disunity of the population increases. This “sets the 
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 stage for clustering, labeling, and codifying the set of producers in the periphery” (Hannan et 
al., 2007: 227). As a result, the contrast between categories increases. In case of newly 
emerging specialists such as in the beer and microradio industry (Carroll & Swaminathan, 
2000; Greve et al., 2006), it represents an opportunity to engage in collective actions to 
sustain an oppositional identity. Needless to say, the higher the perceived contrasts with the 
identity of market leaders, the greater the salience of the identity of peripheral organizations. 
As Hannan and colleagues (2007: 227) put it, “codification and legitimation of the peripheral 
form relies on a distinct vis a vis the center; the resulting collective identity possible will have 
an oppositional character (as in the case of microbrewery). The rise of such an identity can 
stabilize the partitioning”. Other things being equal, the stronger the perceived identity, the 
higher the specialist fitness.  
FIGURE 2-10 
The generalized model 
 
Future research should attempt to test the hypotheses advanced here. In the context of 
German electricity, for example, the intensity of cooperation can be measured by counting 
the number of instances of various types of cooperation agreements among MUs (Hypothesis 
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 1). Directly measuring the audience side delay in perceiving the identity claims however may 
be more demanding (Hypothesis 3 and 4). Nonetheless, following a similar logic to that 
employed in the study on the Dutch newspaper industry (Boone et al., 2002), the audience 
receptiveness to producer’s identity claim may be operationalized by measuring geographical 
variations in the degree of localness of different communities along the social, political and 
economic dimensions. For example, more conservative local communities (i.e., measured 
with election data) and rather homogeneous on a cultural standpoint (i.e., measured by 
emigration data) should be more receptive to the MUs identity.    
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 APPENDIX A 
Equations used to Formalize the Arguments 
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where MC is the market concentration and ܶܥ is the total electricity consumption per period 
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lative price and ெܲ௎ is the average price level of MUs set as a constant 
where  ܣ ெܶ௎ is the actual threat for the MUs and ܧܶ is the external threat, set as a constant in 
base line model and a step function in experiment 1 and 3 
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 oth if ߨ ൌ , erception will never change from the initial perception. the er hand, 0 the p
ܲܥெ௎ ൌ ݂ ሺܲ ெܶ௎ሻ ଶ݂′ ൐ 0       (11) ଶ
where  ܲܥெ௎ is the planned cooperation among MUs and ଶ݂ is the effect of perceived threat 
by MUs on cooperation propensity 
ܥ௧ெ௎ ൌ  ߬ כ  ܲܥெ௎ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ כ ܥ௧ିଵெ௎      (12) 
where  ܥெ௎ is the realized cooperation among MUs and ߬ is the constant which determines 
ow t  co perati n ensity is realized in cooperation action h  fast he o o  prop
ܫெ௎ ൌ  ଷ݂ሺܥெ௎ሻ ଷ݂′ ൐ 0       (13) 
where  ܫெ௎ is the collective identity of MUs and ଷ݂ is the effect of cooperation among MUs 
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where RPI is the relative perceived identity and  ܲܫேௐ௎ is the collective identity of NWU 
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where  allocation HC is the flow of HC switch from municipal utilities (MU) to NWU or vice 
versa and ܲܵு஼ is the price sensitivity of HC, set as a constant 
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 APPENDIX B 
Numerical Values Used in the Simulation 
Symbol Description Numerical Value 
ࡵ࡯ࡺࢃࢁ Market share of NWU in IC segment 70 
ࡴ࡯ࡺࢃࢁ Market share of NWU in HC segment 70 
࡭࡯ࡵ࡯ Average electricity consumption per IC per period 1 
࡭࡯ࡴ࡯ Average electricity consumption per HC per period 1 
ࢀ࡯ Total electricity consumption per period 200 
ࡼࡹࢁ Average price level of MU 1 
ࡱࢀ External threat (base run) 1 
 (Experiment 1 and 3) Step height  [0.05, 0.25]  
࣊ Time taken for updating ET perceived by MUs 1 
ࢌ૛ Effect of perceived threat by MUs on cooperation 
propensity 
1.1*ܲ ெܶ௎ 
࣎ Time taken for “updating” cooperation propensity 
into cooperation action (base run) 
5 
 (Experiment 2 and 3) [1, 100] 
ࢌ૜ Effect of cooperation on MU collective identity 1.1*ܥெ௎ 
࣓ 
Time taken to update customers’ perception of MU 
identity (base run) 
5 
 (experiment 2 and 3) [1, 100] 
ࡼࡵࡺࢃࢁ Perceived collective identity of NWU by customers 1 
ࡼࡿࡵ࡯ Price sensitivity of IC -1 
ࡼࡿࡴ࡯ Price sensitivity of HC (base run) -0.6 and [-1, -0.4] 
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 Chapter 3 
Founding Rates and Identity-Based Resource Partitioning 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A central concern in the sociology of markets deals with the dynamics of market 
segmentation (Park & Podolny, 2000). What drives market differentiation? How does market 
differentiation unfold over time? What are the consequences of market differentiation on 
organizational fitness? These questions are of great importance and have attracted scholarly 
attention from as various research areas as industrial organization (e.g. Tirole, 1988), 
strategic management (e.g. Caves & Porter, 1977) and population ecology (e.g. Carroll, 1985). 
The present chapter aims at contributing to the latter stream of research, and in particular to 
its theory fragment known as resource partitioning.  
Originally developed by Carroll (1985), resource partitioning provides an 
interpretation for the simultaneous existence of generalist and specialist organizations. To 
survive, generalist organizations depend on a wide range of environmental resources, 
whereas specialists on a narrow one. Before the market gets partitioned, generalists and 
specialists compete for the same resources. During the competitive process dictated by 
economies of scale, a few generalists survive, move toward the most abundant portion of the 
market, and grow larger. Increased market concentration is the byproduct of this process. Due 
to inertia and diseconomies of scope, valuable resources get released in the periphery of the 
market and feed the emergence of specialist organizations. The competitive process then 
reaches an equilibrium: generalists and specialists rely on distinct resources and do not 
compete with each other. Therefore, as market concentration rises, the mortality rates of 
generalists should increase whereas that of specialist organizations decrease.  
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 In the recent years, the theory has been extended. Carroll and Swaminathan’s (2000) 
study on the U.S. beer brewery movement pointed to the enactment of an identity alternative 
to that of market leaders as another possible trigger of partitioning. The success of specialist 
breweries in fact did not rely on the scale of producers or on a different quality of the output. 
What mattered was the identity of producers: the identity of generalists, perceived as large 
and modern mass producers, turned out to be problematic for a subset of consumers who 
believed that authentic specialty beer should be brewed by a craft-like firm using traditional 
methods and natural ingredients. Organizational identity, rather than product characteristics, 
guided the choice of such audience members and sustained the emergence of market 
partitioning (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000).  
Notwithstanding the developments of this more recent developments, the theory can 
be further improved by addressing the following three gaps. First, our understanding of 
identity-based market partitioning may be improved by the consideration of various 
dimensions of organizational identities. In particular, recent theoretical advancements in 
organization ecology (Hannan et al., 2007; for a review see also Hannan, 2010) have pointed 
out that beyond focus (i.e., the most common dimension employed to split specialists from 
generalists), contrastFF
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F, resonance and empirical credibility appear as important identity 
dimensions (Baron, 2004; Hsu & Hannan 2005; Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). Second, an 
identity approach to partitioning implies a shift from the ‘old tradition’ concerned with 
differences among producers (e.g., size, niche width, see Carroll, 1985), to the consideration 
of such differences in relation to the cognition and the preferences of audience members. In 
the present study I consider geographical communities as the locus of preference formation 
 
5 The original term used by Baron (2004) was “sharpness”. Later on, “contrast” was increasingly used. The two 
terms seems different but refer to the same concept. For instance “We… characterize the degree to which a 
fuzzy set stands out from its background, what we call its contrast (reflecting its sharpness against the 
background)” (Hannan et al., 2007: 44); “…widespread category spanning lowers categorical contrast- the 
sharpness of a category’s boundaries” (Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2010: 1). To better align with the most recent 
literature, I refer in the paper to contrast instead of “sharpness”.  
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 and variation (see Hannan et al., 2007: 302-303). Last, the effect of identity-based 
partitioning is hard to disentangle from that of product differentiation. For example, 
consumers might prefer specialists producers because of the inherent quality of their products 
or because of the identity of their producers. To better understand the role of identity in 
market partitioning, empirical contexts in which product differentiation is limited are 
especially needed.  
In this chapter, I address each of these limitations by proposing the following. First, 
although the contrast between periphery and center organizations rises as a result of 
competitive release (Hannan et al., 2007; Pólos, Hannan & Carroll, 2010), the emergence of 
an oppositional identity among peripheral producers is likely to trigger new foundings of this 
form and allows the manifestation of market partitioning. Second, I contend the effects of the 
emergence of an oppositional identity vary across audience segments. In particular, I argue 
that the founding rates of peripheral organizations do increase in geographical communities 
whose audience exhibits a greater resonance with the peripheral identity and may easily 
detect the empirical credibility of the peripheral identity. Last, to better disentangle the 
identity effects from those of product differentiation, I study partitioning of what is 
considered a commodity market, i.e., the German electricity industry after deregulation.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I develop the theoretical 
arguments and advance testable hypotheses. The third section presents the empirical findings 
and the robustness checks. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of this research 
and by suggesting future improvements of the present study. 
3.2 OPPOSITIONAL IDENTITIES OF NWUs and MUs 
Our depiction of the MU identity is based on the extensive qualitative evidence 
obtained from four main sources. (i) TNS Emnid survey (1999; 2003; 2005; 2009): The 
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 telephone surveys have been funded by VKU (the trade association for MUs) and carried out 
by TNS Emnid Market Research. The sample size for the year 1999, 2003 and 2005 is 500, 
for 2009 is 1000. (ii) ifm study (2006): This study has been funded by the umbrella trade 
association BDEW (German Association of Energy and Water Industries) and conducted by 
ifm market research institute. The study consists of 60 in-depth interviews with household 
customers each lasting 1.5 to 2 hours, carried out by professional psychologists. (iii) BDEW 
customer surveys (BDEW household customer survey, 1999-2009; BDEW commercial 
customer survey 2000-2009): funded by BDEW and conducted by PROMIT Institut fuer 
Prognose, Marktforschung & Informationstechniken. The sample size is 1200 for household 
customers and 1040 for commercial customers from 13 business areas. (iv). 11 semi-
structured in-depth interviews conducted between 2008 and 2010, each lasting 1 to 2 hours. 
The interviewees include 6 MU managers and department chiefs and industry experts holding 
critical positions at BDEW and VKU. Three informant have been interviewed twice. In 
addition, I carried out a considerable number of interviews at industrial conferences or via 
telephone.  
FIGURE 3-1: 
The NWUs representing the confusing market (left side) and  
the “own municipal utilities” (right side) (Source: ifm 2006) 
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 Collectively, this research reveals two important findings. First, customers nowadays 
perceive the identities of the NWUs and their “own municipal utilities” as distinct and 
oppositional. As illustrated in Figure 3-1, while the large corporations embody the 
omnipotent, uncontrollable and abstract aspects of electricity, the small or medium sized 
MUs provide to the abstract product of electricity a tangible and familiar face, well 
represented by the drawings of the interviewees in terms of the cosy and pleasant everyday 
life that electricity enables (ifm, 2006). The second finding concerns the three distinguishing 
features of the MU identity: localness, reliability and environmental friendliness. According 
to a recent survey (TNS Emnid, 2009), customers associated MUs with “orientation on the 
common welfare of the local region”, “support for the local region”, “supply security” and 
“reliability”, as well as “environmental friendly behavior”. In contrast, the NWUs are 
described as “profit seeking”, “flexibility”, and “customer orientation” (Figure 3-2). The 
prominence of the three identity features is also consistent throughout the TNS Emnid 
surveys held in 1999, 2003, and 2005. Let’s take a closer look on each of the three identity 
features.  
FIGURE 3-2. 
The oppositional images of MUs and private utilities (Source: TNS Emnid survey 2009) 
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 Localness appears as the most prominent MU identity feature according to the TNS 
Emnid surveys (1999; 2003; 2005; 2009). As shown in Figure 3-2, whereas 45% of the 
interviewees expect “orientation on the common welfare of the local region” and “support for 
the local region” from the MUs, only 9% think so of private utilities. This is consistent with 
the results of the ifm psychological survey (ifm, 2006). One of the most important customer 
type identified by this surveys is “local patriots”. This group of customers perceive both 
themselves and the MUs as deeply rooted in the local community. The local MUs belong to 
the taken-for-granted part of one’s living space like the school and bars. In other words, the 
MU is seen as a symbol of the community itself, with which citizens strongly identify. Thus 
they feel being obliged to show solidarity toward their MUs: “I think I in the region should 
hold together.” Alternative offerings from the NWUs are perceived as “assault” from outside 
attacking one’s own living space and should be fended off. It is therefore not surprising that 
attempts to privatize MUs are compared with “selling off family jewelry” (Tafelsilber in 
German) and have sparked off citizen referendums or even demonstrations in  various 
communities (e.g. Energie & Management, 2001; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2008). Local pride 
also leads the local patriots to attach emotion to the commodity electricity, like a customer of 
the MU Dresden proudly declared: “this is Dresdener electricity” (ifm, 2006). An energy 
expert confirmed “the idea of ‘we from here’ is very powerful” and associated this with the 
comparably low switching rate of MU customers (Die Welt, 2010). The classic MU structure 
with broad product spectrum and local engagement helps to strengthen the community feeling: 
the MU does not simply sells electricity to individual citizens, but supports the local 
communities in various ways such as entertaining the swimming pool or the public transport, 
and supporting the youth club etc (ifm, 2006). Compared to MU’s well received local 
engagements, NWU’s efforts seem to be unconvincing as indicated by the oppositional 
market picture. For example, EnBW, the number three of the NWUs, has conducted a 
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 campaign claiming their local and environmental friendly engagements in the local press of 
Baden-Württemberg. The director of MU Tübingen attacked this as unauthentic: “we pay 
dividend in Tübingen and not in Paris”, pointing to EnBW’s shareholder- the French nuclear 
giant EdF (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2008). Due to the strong attachment to their MUs, the local 
patriots tend to unconsciously blend out market information. They do not pay attention to 
other suppliers, show no interests in knowing alternative offerings and are hardly price 
sensitive. On the one side, they value the good quality supply and are willing to pay a bit 
more for the “local” electricityFF
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F. On the other side, they are tolerant toward the price 
differences, since the money stays in the region and benefits the citizens (ifm, 2006).  
Reliability is another important MU identity feature. Whereas 37% of the customers 
expected security and reliability from MUs, only 6% associate reliability with private utilities 
(Figure 3-2). Here, reliability does not only mean technological reliability. The ifm survey 
(2006) indicates that reliability appears intertwined with the trustworthiness granted to a 
family member or an old friend. The majority of the interviewees have long and good 
relations with their MUs. Often the parents and the grandparents were already customers. As 
a kind of “inherited” family tradition, one knows the MU from childhood, being assured that 
in case of power failure “the man from the MU” comes. The MUs belongs to the familiar and 
comforting taken-for-grantedness in life and are considered as a member of one’s extended 
family or an old friend, whom one though does not meet very often (blackouts happens only 
seldom), but feels that he can be relied on. For citizens, their local MU is “THE electricity 
supplier”. Out of this quasi family relation, customers expect the MUs to “take care of” one 
and not “leave one in the lurch” in case of trouble. Also like to family members or friends, 
 
6 On a technical standpoint it is hard to tell whether the electricity one buys is local or not. One interviewee 
illustrates in the following way: imagine there are 5 rivers flowing into a lake. You take one glass of water from 
the lake and it is impossible to say that it is from river A. According to the ifm survey (2006), this seems to be 
well known among the customers being aware that “electricity is electricity” and the NWUs generates a 
majority of the German electricity. However, the psychological effects of “local electricity” which is actually 
only distributed by the local MUs persists. This is similar to the phenomenon that people pay premium prices 
for “green” electricity.  
49 
 
 citizens appear tolerant toward occasional failures of their MUs: “a short blackout can happen 
everywhere,” “Everyone makes mistakes”. Broadly speaking, trustworthiness, decency and 
reliability of the MUs are highly appreciated and price differences do not matter much: local 
customers generally do not even initiate a price comparison, easily available in internet. If 
they accidently come to know a price difference, they justify it with the good quality supplyFF
                                                           
7
F, 
as long as the price difference is “within reasonable range”.  
Environmental friendliness is the third pivotal feature of the MU identity. Whereas 35% 
of the consumers associate environmental friendliness with MUs, merely 8% think so in 
relation to NWUs and other private utilities. This is the result of MUs’ continuous 
engagements to meet audience’s expectations. The early years of the BDEW household and 
commercial customer surveys pointed out that both NWUs and MUs show image deficit with 
respect to environment relevant aspects” and urges its members to take measures (e.g. BDEW 
household customer survey, 1999; BDEW commercial customer survey, 2000). MUs have 
engaged in actions such as providing energy saving tips in the own customer magazine, 
image campaigns in the local press, building photovoltaic arrays on the roof of the local 
kindergarden and constructing environmental friendly combined heat and power (CHP) 
generation capacity. In contrast, even when actively engaging into portraying themselves as 
 
7  As illustrated before, both localness as well as family-like trustworthiness and reliability apply to the 
emotional attachment to the distinct identity of MUs, which overwhelms other alternative explanations. For 
example, It has been often suggested that what customers value is not the identity, but the customized services 
of MUs. However, data shows that around 70% of the household customers actually never have had any direct 
contact with their electricity suppliers (BDEW household customer survey, 1999 to 2006). It suggests that the 
feeling of good services is mainly a psychological one based on their perception of MU identity. Customer 
inertia has been often offered as another alternative explanation for the low switching rate and surprisingly great 
vitality of MUs. The BDEW household customer surveys (1999 to 2006) indicates clearly that it is not the case. 
The proportion of customers who do not switch suppliers because “I have a close relationship with my current 
supplier, which I do not want to give up” has jumped from 35% in 1999 to around 80% in 2001 and stayed 
relatively stable afterwards. In contrast, the proportion of customer fearing “high efforts involved in switching” 
and “risk of lower supply security” have been much lower and stayed at around 40%. Accidently, 1999 to 2001 
is also the period in which the majority of the regional utilities have perished and identities of MUs and NWUs 
have been increasingly perceived as oppositional as data indicates. Note that here I do not claim that alternative 
explanations play no role at all. Instead, I propose that they cannot explain away our core argument of MU 
identity and identity is actually more important than the alternative explanations.  
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 environmental friendly (e.g. Die Welt, 2001), NWUs turned out to be rather unsuccessful. 
The factual high percentage of electricity generated by their coal plants and especially 
nuclear power plants have made their claims anything but authentic and the NWUs are duly 
called “nuclear utilities” (e.g. Der Spiegel, 2002; Financial Times Deutschland, 2010).  
3.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
9BOppositional Identities at Work 
The most recent elaboration of resource partitioning theory underscores the role of 
competitive release due to the demise of near-center producers (Hannan et al., 2007). The 
absence of the near-center producers from the market picture potentially increases the 
contrast between the center (thus C) and the periphery (thus P) organizations (Hannan et al., 
2007: 44, 227). According to this narrative, competitive release and increasing category 
contrast are considered as necessary conditions for identity driven market partitioning – but 
not sufficient to guarantee durable market partitioning. As Pólos and colleagues (2010) have 
pointed out, the manifestation of durable market partitioning requires the emergence of a 
distinct evaluative schema depicting the identity of peripheral organizations as oppositional 
to that of the center players. According to Pólos and Colleagues (2010), one possibility is that 
the P schema represents a mild variation of the C schema. Under this scenario and positive 
returns of scale, as Cs possess large engagement budget they may gain appeal by engaging in 
the social positions of the Ps rendering market partitioning temporary. For example, in the 
U.S. wine industry, when generalists are able to assume a robust identity and engage in 
specialists’ social positions, specialist vitality is decreased (Swaminathan, 2001).  
Another possibility is that the P schema is oppositional to the C schema. This is the 
case when for example a high grade of membership in C impedes that engagement in the 
social positions of P would generate actual appeal. One example of oppositional schemas has 
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 been presented by Rao and colleagues (Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003) in their study on French 
cuisine. The classical and the nouvelle French cuisine take opposite values in 5 feature 
dimensions: culinary rhetoric, rules of cooking, archetypical ingredients, role of the chef and 
organization of the menu. For instance, whereas the rules of cooking in classical schema 
centre on conformation and sublimation, those of the nouvelle schema accentuate 
transgression. As Pólos and colleagues (2010) demonstrate, only when Ps and Cs possess 
opposite schemas, it becomes hard for Cs to erode the social positions of Ps and market 
partitioning stabilizes. 
The German electricity market is a case in point. The downfall of the regional utilities 
soon after deregulation disrupted the unity of the market picture and increased the contrast 
between NWUs and MUs. As the ifm psychological survey (2006) puts it: “…between the 
cross-regional and the regional suppliers there exists no shades of grey for most of the 
interviewees“ (61). The ifm study concludes that the customers have a “partitioned market 
picture” (60). The MU and the NWU identity take opposite values of the relevant features as 
the qualitative evidence has shown. Whereas MUs are perceived as orienting on common 
welfare of the local citizens, NWUs are seen as profit oriented. Whereas MUs are linked with 
environmental friendliness, NWUs are denounced as “nuclear utilities”. Whereas MUs 
personify a reliable and trustworthy old friend, NWUs embody the uncontrollable greedy evil. 
Attempts of NWUs to engage in MU’s social positions have been perceived as unauthentic 
and failed to generate audience appeal. As a consequence, the market position of MUs has 
not been eroded by NWUs. MUs sustained and even gained market share and strength. In 
2009, 70% of the people think that energy and water supply should be handled by MUs. At 
the same time, the proportion of citizens who “could imagine to have their electricity 
supplied by the NWUs” decreased from over 40% to less that 30% (TNS Emnid study, 2005; 
2009). The oppositional MU identity is so powerful that the MUs declared themselves as 
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 “Robin Hood against the Big Four” (Zeitung für kommunale Wirtschaft, 2006a). More and 
more municipalities see the advantages of having an own MU, with which they could counter 
the “nuclear utilities”, help the environment by generating renewable energy and by 
supporting the local community (Gelnhäuser Tageblatt, 2010; Hamburger Abendblatt, 2010a). 
The result is a clear trend to remunicipalization, as admitted even by the spokesperson of an 
NWU “…municipal suppliers are experiencing a renaissance” (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2009). 
An increasing number of municipalities and cities founded their own MUs by buying back 
the electricity or gas grid from the NWUs (e.g. Die Welt, 2008b).  
Building on arguments and qualitative evidence, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The more the identity of periphery and center organizations is 
perceived as oppositional, the larger the founding rates of peripheral organizations. 
10BAudience Heterogeneity: Identity Resonance and Empirical Credibility 
The previous section proposes that an identity increasingly oppositional to that of the 
dominant will lead to more foundings of peripheral organizations. This section argues that the 
effect of market partitioning may vary across audience segments marked by heterogeneous fit 
with the identity claims of the peripheral form. I focus on audience heterogeneity through the 
lens of geography by drawing on the organizational identity and social movement literatures. 
The relationship between economic activity and geographical communities has 
interested economists and sociologists (for a review, see Sorenson & Baum, 2003). Macro-
organizational scholars have contributed to this literature by investigating the relationship 
between geography and the evolution of organizational populations. Empirical research have 
shown that spatial variations matter for ecological processes such as organizational entries 
and exits (Lomi, 1995; Greve, 2002; Wezel, 2005; Cattani, Pennings & Wezel, 2003). 
Geography appears to play a vital role for the emergence of new organizational forms as well. 
McKendrick and colleagues (McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll & Khessina, 2003) claim that 
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 geographic agglomeration, especially of de novo firms entering the disk array industry, helps 
the emerging industry to coalesce around a common identity. By the same token, other 
scholars have investigated how community level factors systematically influence the success 
or failure of social movements (Greve, Pozner & Rao, 2006; Ingram, Yue & Rao 2010).  
Geographical communities are important for comprehending the structure and 
dynamics of audience preferences. As Hannan and colleagues (2007: 302) suggested, “a 
potential valuable extension… of audience segment would consider geography. I defined 
segment as subsets of an audience that are largely closed with respect to interaction and 
communication. Such closure often takes a spatial form: social networks tend toward spatial 
closure. Therefore, audience segments likely to form in spatial patches… Perhaps variation 
over local audience segments in the legitimation of categories also plays a role”. I follow this 
stream of research and argue that geography matters for of the unfolding of identity-based 
market partitioning. In particular, I claim that the effect postulated by Hypothesis 1 vary 
across regions. In particular, I claim that the effect of market partitioning vary across 
communities and focus on two factors that may influence the degree of support exhibited by 
local audiences to the peripheral form: identity resonance and empirical credibility.  
Originated from the study of frame resonance in the social movement literature, 
identity resonance captures extent to which identities “capture or activate powerful 
distinctions along social, ethnic, religious, economic, political, and cultural lines” (Baron, 
2004: 11). According to Snow and Benford (1998; Benford & Snow 2000), to mobilizes 
support, recruit members, and legitimate a movement’s goal, a movement’s ideal must be 
resonant with the social and cultural values held by its constituents. Likewise, institutional 
entrepreneurs who are skilful in employing frames as mobilization devices can win the 
support of the targeted audiences (Rao, 1998). By effectively “framing issues related to the 
construction and defence of categories” (p.115), activists often point to the shortcomings of 
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 the existing forms and hold out a better set of alternative arrangements with the new forms 
(Hannan et al., 2007). For example, the microbrew activists have criticised the generalists as 
unauthentic and low quality manufacturers and portrayed themselves as authentic and high 
quality producers (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). The unimodal resource distribution of the 
US beer market embodies distinctions between social spaces along the social, economic, 
political and cultural lines (Carroll, Dobrev & Swaminathan, 2002). The specialist identity 
apparently resonates with the tastes and values held by the more affluent and knowledgeable 
consumers occupying the social spaces at the periphery. In short, possessing an identity 
resonant with the target audience is crucial for the peripheral form to mobilize support.  
Identity resonance alone does not guarantee audience support. Empirical research in 
social movement theory has shown that besides frame resonance, empirical credibility is 
another relevant condition that shapes a movement’s mobilization power. A movement frame 
must exhibit empirical credibility, namely an apparent consistency between the framing and 
the relevant events observed (Babb, 1996). For example, due to its store- front location and 
the direct observability of its production equipment, brewpubs appeared to be the most 
socially visible organizational form in the US micro-brewery movement. Brewpub thus 
enjoys more empirical credibility than contract brewery and emerged as the most legitimate 
peripheral form in the process of partitioning of this market (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000).  
The qualitative data on the German electricity industry seems to support the 
theoretical arguments concerning resonance. Take the case of Energie Hamburg, an MU in 
northern Germany which has been re-established in 2009. To fill the city budget deficit, 
Hamburg sold its MU in 2002 to Vattenfall Europe, number four of the NWUs. The mayor, 
who together with his predecessor backed up the privatization, admitted in 2007 the selling of 
the family jewellery was “a mistake” and enthusiastically supported the refounding 
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 2009b) of the “municipal utility 2.0” (Hamburger Abendblatt, 
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 2009a). Like the mayor of Hamburg, local politicians of communities with values resonant to 
MU identity know that with their support toward MUs they can score points by their voters 
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2009). In case of Hamburg, MU’s environmental friendly identity 
feature is clearly resonant with the pronounced “greenness” of Hamburg- the European Green 
Capital for the year 2011 (Hamburger Abendblatt, 2009b). By founding, the MU also stressed 
its distinct localness and called for citizen’s support. When asked why a customer should 
choose the new MU in such a competitive regional market with so many cheaper suppliers, 
the MU director replied: “because we work in Hamburg for Hamburg…and we invest our 
profit back in Hamburg” (Hamburger Abendblatt, 2009b). The warm support from the 
audience side proved the powerfulness of identity resonance. For example, when asked by the 
local newspaper “Are you considering a switch to the new MU”, 61% of the 1075 surveyed 
readers answered with yes (Hamburger Abendblatt, 2009c). The environment minister of 
Hamburg was among the first switching to the new MU (Hamburger Abendblatt, 2009d). 
Barely one year after refounding, the new MU has won 15,000 customers (Hamburger 
Abendblatt, 2010b). And a group of citizens started a popular initiative “Our Hamburg, our 
networks” to collect signatures so that a referendum could be held on the topic of buying 
back energy networks from Vattenfall Europe and E.ON Hanse (Hamburger Abendblatt, 
2010c).  
Empirical credibility of the MU identity as confirmed by the activities of other MUs 
was a fundamental trigger of MU foundings as well. Take the example of Regionalwerk 
Bodensee. As a newly founded MU in rural areas of Baden-Württemberg, influences of the 
neighbouring MUs seem essential for its founding. For example, over 60 regional MUs 
declared their areas as “EnBW-free” zone and formed the cooperation group to support each 
other to remain competitive and independent of NWUs (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2008). The 
members of this cooperation group support the local communities, engaged in collective 
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 campaign of their distinct localness, collectively built environmental friendly power 
generation capacities (SüdWestStrom home page). One member of the cooperation group is 
the MU in Friedrichshafen, a community about 30 km from the seven founding communities 
of the new MU. The MU Friedrichshafen played a key role in encouraging the founding of 
Regionalwerk Bodensee by bringing in gas networks, helping with technical know-how, and 
holding a 24% share (Energie & Management, 2008a). 
Based on these theoretical accounts and on qualitative evidence, I propose: 
Hypothesis 2. The founding rates of peripheral organizations increase with the 
resonance of the values and principles of the peripheral form with those of the local 
audience members. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The founding rates of peripheral organizations increase with the 
empirical credibility of the peripheral identity in the local community. 
3.4 DATA AND METHODS 
11BData Sources 
By anchoring audience heterogeneity to geographical communities, I chose to conduct 
the study at the district level (Regierungsbezirk). This is one of the most important 
administrative unit in Germany as from the beginning of the 19th century (Gunlicks, 1984). 
District is also a well accepted level for German geographical units across disciplines such as 
geography (e.g. Dickinson, 1959), agricultural economics (e.g. Vickery & Sant 1946), 
politics (e.g. Gunlicks, 1984) and history (Hochstadt, 1981).  
To test the hypotheses, I collected four sets of quantitative data. The first data set 
concerns the number of MU foundings and the MU density in the 40 German districts over 
the period 1999-2009. The data were primarily obtained from BDEW for the period 2001 to 
2007. Missing years were filled manually using information from the VKU member register 
of various years. The resulting data was then verified by comparing with a variety of sources: 
the verivox’s (a popular internet portal for product comparison) lists of the electricity 
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 suppliers from 2000 to 2010; the German firm register (Bundesanzeiger); firm data banks 
such as Hoppenstedt, BeDirect and D&B; home pages of MUs and MU cooperation groups; 
and the German national and local press. To account for the audience heterogeneity across 
districts, I collected from the German Federal Statistical Office Web Site the second data set 
with the socio-demographic statistics of the 40 German districts. The coverage of the data 
ranges from 1998 to 2008, depending on the variables.  
The third and the fourth data set concern audience perception of the oppositional 
identities of MUs and NWUs as well as the empirical credibility of MUs identity claims. For 
this purpose I recurred to newspaper articles. This is a legitimate method to study audience 
perception and increasingly used in organizational studies (e.g. Deephouse, 1996; Kennedy, 
2008). Moreover, according to the BDEW customer surveys (BDEW household customer 
survey, 1999- 2009; BDEW commercial customer survey, 2000- 2009), daily newspaper is 
the most important source through which audience members experiences electricity suppliers. 
After extensive reading and comparisons, I noted that regional newspapers appear more 
sympathetic towards MUs. This is hardly surprising since localness is one of MUs most 
important identity features. Therefore, as a first step in the direction of testing my arguments, 
I coded one regional newspaper Hamburger Abendblatt -- that covers northern Germany -- to 
proxy the perception toward the MU identity. In doing so, I searched for all articles 
mentioning the word “Stadtwerke” (municipal utilities in German) and the company names of 
the locally dominating NWUs. After deleting duplicates and unrelated articles (e.g. articles 
concern NWUs’ international activities with foreign MUs), the final data consists of 235 
articles for the period of 1999 to 2009.  
While the third data set concerns attitude, the last data set deals with behaviors – i.e., 
MUs activities being confirmed or disconfirmed empirically. After extensive reading and 
comparison, I have decided for Die Welt, the third largest national newspaper in Germany 
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 and the least regionally and politically biased. I searched for all articles mentioning 
“Stadtwerke” (MUs) in Die Welt from 1999 to 2009. After deleting duplicates and unrelated 
articles, the final data set consists of 1237 articles. At this stage of the research, I opted for 
collecting the data from a national newspaper for two reasons. First, due to overlapping of 
coverage areas, reports on some MUs might be inflated. Second, another possible source of 
bias could arise from the extent to which each regional newspaper decides to cover the news 
concerning MU activities. 
12BVariables 
15BDependent Variable 
Founding rates have been often modeled as event count (see Carroll & Hannan, 2000). 
Building on previous studies (e.g. Cattani et al., 2003; Stuart & Sorensen 2003; Marquis & 
Lounsbury 2007), I focused on the number of yearly entries of MUs at the district level. 
Figure 3-3 plots the distribution of German MUs foundings from 1999 to 2009. 
FIGURE 3-3 
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16BIndependent and Control Variables 
Oppositional Identities. To test H1, I rated as 1 any article in which NWUs and MUs 
identities were presented as oppositional and 0 otherwise. Then I added the annual number of 
the articles reporting the two identities as oppositional and divided it by the annual number of 
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 all articles. The resulting proportion is then used as a proxy for the extent of oppositional 
identities in the market. Formally: 
݌݁ݎܿ݁݅ݒ݁݀ ݋݌݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ݅݀݁݊ݐ݅ݐ݅݁ݏ ݋݂ ܯܷݏ ܽ݊݀ ܹܷܰݏ ݅݊ ݕ݁ܽݎ ݐ
ൌ  
ܽ݊݊ݑ݈ܽ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܽݎݐ݈݅ܿ݁ݏ ݎ݁݌݋ݎݐ݅݊݃ ݋݌݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ݅݀݁݊ݐ݅ݐ݅݁ݏ
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽ݊݊ݑ݈ܽ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܽݎݐ݈݅ܿ݁ݏ ܿ݋_݉݁݊ݐ݅݋݊݅݊݃ ܯܷݏ ܽ݊݀ ܹܷܰݏ
 
Resonance. To test H2, I need to measure the extent to which the values incorporated 
in the MU identity are traceable in the local community. Remember that three MU identity 
features arise from the qualitative evidence: localness, reliability and environmental 
friendliness. For localness, I employed the voter turnout in county elections (Voter Turnout). 
Regions where people care more about the development and well-being of the local 
communities exhibit higher voter turnout. The higher the voter turnout, the greater the 
resonance with MU’s localness. Since county elections are held every 5 years, the missing 
years have been filled with linear interpolation. For reliability, I counted the proportion of 
people over the age of 50 (%Age Over50). Older people are more risk averse and thus put 
more emphasis on reliability of electricity supply, fundamental for the functioning of a 
normal everyday life. For environmental friendliness, I measured the proportion of people in 
a district voting for the German Green Party in the Bundestag (the lower house of the 
parliament at the federal level) election (%Voter Green). Measuring this construct by using 
county elections may distort the picture as the Green Party do not have a candidate in every 
region. Bundestag elections are held every four years and linear interpolation was used for 
filling missing years. The three measured were lagged of 1 year to ensure exogeneity. 
Empirical Credibility. To test H3, I constructed a variable (Empirical Credibility) to 
measure the MUs activities in accordance with the three identity features. In a first step I 
assigned the articles to the specific MU mentioned and to the district where such an MU is 
located. I then coded each article as confirming or not the MU identity claims. As a last step, 
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 the annual empirical credibility of MU identity in each district is calculated by subtracting the 
number of disconfirming articles from the confirming ones. For example, in district 1 during 
2001, I found 33 supportive articles and 18 ones disconfirming local MUs’ identity claims. 
Then the resulting net number of 15 is used as a proxy for empirical credibility of MUs in 
district 1 in year 1999. This variable has been lagged of one year. I have decided for the net 
number of articles rather than a proportional measure since the former one takes both 
proportion and magnitude into consideration across regions. For instance, for district A with 
2 confirming and 1 disconfirming article and district B with 100 confirming and 50 
disconfirming articles, the latter measure would show equal values of 0.5 for both districts. 
This clearly does not reflect how the empirical consistency of MU identity would be 
perceived in district A and B.  
Several controls were added to the models. I controlled for MU density at the district 
level (MU Density) since foundings are affected by MU density according to density 
dependence theory (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). Furthermore, I controlled for population per 
sqkm (Population/sqkm) because population density tend to increase MU foundings. More 
densely populated areas are considered in the industry as “fillet pieces” which are more 
profitable (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2010). Whereas population density takes household 
customer density into consideration, I also controlled for the density of industrial customers 
with the number of industry firms per district-year (#Industry Firms). These variables have 
been lagged of one year. Furthermore, I controlled for districts in formal East Germany (East) 
since MUs were disbanded in the German Democratic Republic. After reunification in 1990, 
many communities re-founded their MUs. Lastly, I controlled for the first period after 
deregulation from 1999 to 2000 (1999-2000), since the foundings shortly after deregulation 
might have been caused by reasons other than identity related ones. Table 3-1 and 2-2 present 
the descriptives  and the bivariate correlations of the variables used in the models.   
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 TABLE 3-1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Oppositional Identities 440 0.37 0.20 0.00 0.65 
Voter Turnout 440 55.95 7.04 34.67 77.89 
%Age Over50 429 0.29 0.02 0.25 0.36 
%Voter Green 440 5.99 2.35 2.11 12.77 
Empirical Credibility 440 0.70 8.94 -25.00 30.00 
MU Density 440 17.10 10.75 0.00 43.00 
Population/sqkm 429 429.18 688.17 71.78 3849.15 
#Industry Firms 429 1214.12 683.64 290.00 3297.00 
East 440 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
1999-2000 440 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
 
TABLE 3-2 
Bivariate Correlations 
Oppositional
Identities 
Voter  
Turnout 
%Age 
Over50 
%Voter 
Green 
Empirical 
Credibility
MU 
Density 
Popul. 
/sqkm 
#Industry 
Firms East 
1999- 
2000 
Oppositional 
Identities 1.00
Voter Turnout -0.26 1.00 
%Age Over50 0.30 -0.63 1.00 
%Voter Green 0.16 0.19 -0.36 1.00 
Empirical 
Credibility  -0.33 0.26 -0.23 -0.05 1.00 
MU Density 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 1.00 
Population/sqkm 0.02 0.20 -0.05 0.60 0.00 -0.35 1.00 
#Industry Firms -0.01 -0.11 -0.20 0.24 0.02 0.45 -0.06 1.00 
East -0.03 -0.46 0.63 -0.50 0.00 -0.17 0.10 -0.26 1.00 
1999-2000 -0.70 0.29 -0.28 -0.16 0.59 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 1.00 
 
13B 
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 Model Specification 
Following the lead of various studies of organizational entries, I presumed that the 
number of MU entries in each state follows a Poisson distribution. The main problem to deal 
with is overdispersion - i.e., the tendency of the variance of the entry rate to increase faster 
than its mean. In the presence of overdispersion, although parameter estimates remain 
unbiased, they are inefficient and their standard errors are biased downward (Long, 1997). In 
order to correct for overdispersion, I recurred to negative binomial regression. With ߮௧ as 
district fixed effects, ߱௜௧ as a set of control variables and the covariates as described before, 
the expected number of MU entries in district i in year t, ߣ௜௧, is specified in the following way: 
ߣ௜௧ ൌ ߮௧expሾߚ଴  ൅ ߚଵܱ݌݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ܫ݀݁݊ݐ݅ݐ݅݁ݏ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܸ݋ݐ݁ݎ ܶݑݎ݊݋ݑݐ௜௧
൅ ߚଷ%ܣ݃݁ ܱݒ݁ݎ50௜௧ ൅ ߚସ%ܸ݋ݐ݁ݎ ܩݎ݁݁݊௜௧ ൅ ߚହܧ݉݌݅ݎ݈݅ܿܽ ܥݎܾ݈݁݀݅݅݅ݐݕ௜௧
൅ ߚ߱௜௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ሿ 
To obtain the more conservative tests of the hypotheses, I dealt with the unobserved 
heterogeneity due to the panel structure of the dataset by employing a fixed effects estimation 
method. However, the conventional conditional fixed effects as proposed by Hausman, Hall 
and Griliches (1984), is not a true fixed effects method according to Allison and Waterman 
(2002). Therefore, I implemented the unconditional fixed effects technique as suggested by 
Allison and Waterman (2002). The analysis was run with Stata version 10.  
3.5 RESULTS 
Table 3-3 shows the unconditional fixed effect estimates of the negative binomial 
models for the number of MU foundings in the German electricity market from 1999 to 2009. 
Model 1 includes only the control variables. Except for Industry Firms, the parameter 
estimates of all the control variables appear in the expected direction – albeit failing to reach 
statistical significance. Model 2 reports the test of the argument concerning the positive effect 
of perceived oppositional identities on MU foundings. Consistent with H1, the estimate of 
Oppositional Identities is positive and statistically significant.  
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 In Model 3 I find evidence in support of Hypothesis H2, according to which 
resonance between MU identity and local audience values enhances MU founding rates. As 
expected, the effect of Voter Turnout (localness) is positive and significant, suggesting that as 
the resonance of the local community to the MU identity increases, more MU foundings are 
observed in the focal district. The positive and significant effect of %Age Over50 (reliability) 
lends further support for H2. The parameter estimate for %Voter Green is positive as 
expected, but statistically not significant – but see the GEE estimates reported in Table 3-4.  
TABLE 3-3 
Unconditional Fixed Effects Estimates of the Negative Binomial Models for MU 
Foundings, 1999- 2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES  H1 H2 H3 All 
      
Oppositional Identities  4.797** 3.510* 5.152** 3.637† 
  (1.615) (1.652) (1.911) (1.884) 
Voter Turnout   0.404**  0.408** 
   (0.085)  (0.094) 
%Age Over50   161.684**  159.237** 
   (55.752)  (59.801) 
%Voter Green   0.439  0.255 
   (0.467)  (0.617) 
Empirical Credibility    0.043** 0.019 
    (0.016) (0.023) 
MU Density 0.124 -0.034 -0.467 -0.170 -0.489 
 (0.285) (0.253) (0.408) (0.202) (0.388) 
Population/sqkm 0.053 0.056 0.147** 0.053 0.150** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.056) 
#Industry Firms -0.010† -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
East 8.610 6.861 1.406 12.585 3.915 
 (15.756) (15.202) (5.776) (14.190) (7.593) 
1999-2000 0.019 1.753† 1.508 1.148 1.123 
 (0.730) (1.053) (1.100) (1.052) (1.208) 
District1 20.563 19.354 20.789** 28.360* 22.155** 
 (17.437) (16.134) (5.516) (14.141) (6.743) 
… … … … … … 
      
District39 -7.937 -7.116 -1.780 -9.650 -4.150 
 (10.796) (10.649) (9.968) (10.271) (9.447) 
Constant -21.868** -23.390** -97.336** -24.827** -94.383** 
 (4.943) (5.081) (21.460) (5.148) (22.381) 
Observations 429 429 429 429 429 
LL -72.21 -67.38 -60.73 -66.01 -60.55 
 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 (Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
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 Model 4 tests Hypothesis 3 concerning the positive effects of empirical credibility of 
the periphery form identity on founding rates. Indeed, the parameter estimate of Empirical 
Credibility appears positive and statistically significant. Although the explanatory power of 
empirical credibility is diminished by the simultaneous addition of all the variables in the 
model, the estimates reported in Model 5 appear aligned with those discussed so far. 
14BRobustness Checks 
To prove the robustness of the results, I undertook several additional tests. I 
conducted the analysis with the XTGEE routine using the “exchangeable” correlation 
structure which fits the data best. Table 3-4 shows the estimates of the GEE models for the 
number of MU foundings. In Model 2, I can observe that H1 is also supported in GEE model. 
In Model 3, %Voter Green which was not siginificant in the FE model turned significant 
whereas Voter Turnout lost significance. On the whole, H2 is also supported here. In Model 4, 
H3 finds no support. The results of Model 5 appear consistent with those of Table 3-3. To 
conclude, a general consistency across the results obtained from the unconditional FE and the 
GEE models was observed.  
TABLE 3-4 
GEE Estimates of the Negative Binomial Models for MU Foundings, 1999- 2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES  H1 H2 H3 All 
      
Oppositional Identities  5.594** 3.569† 5.724** 3.608† 
  (1.803) (1.884) (1.989) (1.960) 
Voter Turnout   0.063  0.059 
   (0.040)  (0.042) 
%Age Over50   66.578**  64.042* 
   (24.535)  (26.043) 
%Voter Green   0.441**  0.422** 
   (0.141)  (0.148) 
Empirical Credibility    0.036 0.011 
    (0.030) (0.027) 
MU Density 0.052** 0.050** 0.027† 0.049** 0.028† 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
Population/sqkm 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
#Industry Firms 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
65 
 
 East -1.753† -1.696† -2.318* -1.663 -2.290* 
 (1.019) (1.028) (1.112) (1.031) (1.116) 
1999-2000 -0.616 1.696 1.909† 1.127 1.724 
 (0.593) (1.051) (1.000) (1.141) (1.118) 
Constant -3.804** -6.622** -31.114** -6.591** -30.004** 
 (0.687) (1.216) (8.790) (1.284) (9.409) 
Observations 429 429 429 429 429 
 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 (Standard errors in parentheses) 
The second check concerns the variable Oppositional Identities. As a first empirical 
test of the arguments, I decided to code the information of a regional newspaper to proxy the 
national sentiment of the MU and NWU identity as oppositional. Although reasonable, this 
choice relies on a strong assumption that the oppositional identities of MUs and NWUs as 
perceived in the coverage area of this regional newspaper is representative for other areas of 
Germany, for which additional investigations are desirable. One way to do it is to run the 
same analysis solely for the areas directly covered by this regional newspaper. My 
expectation is that the effect of Oppositional Identities should be amplified in the “home 
territory” of the newspaper. I repeated the analyses by using both unconditional FE and GEE 
techniques for an extended coverage area of 13 districts. In the results not reported here, I 
find evidence of such expected stronger effects across all 5 hypotheses. While this trend of 
results adds to the faith in the results, I remain fully aware of the need of coding more 
regional newspapers in the near future.  
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Inspired by a few limitations of existing research on market partitioning (Carroll, 
1985; Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000) and drawing on studies on organizational identities 
(Hannan et al., 2007), the present chapter aimed at improving our understanding of the 
processes of identity-based partitioning. To reach this goal, I followed a research design that 
combines qualitative and quantitative evidence. Although increasing oppositional identities 
among the dominant and the peripheral form would lead to market partitioning, this effect 
66 
 
 vary substantially across audience segments. Looking closer at audience heterogeneity 
through the lens of geography, I suggested that founding rates increased with greater 
resonance between the peripheral identity and the values endorsed by the local community. 
Market partitioning can be further sustained when consistency between identity claims and 
producer actions become apparent to local audience members. The testing of this arguments 
carried out in the German electricity market during 1999-2009 brought support to my 
narrative. 
This chapter contributes to the research on resource partitioning theory and 
organizational identities in the following ways. First, this study outlines the process through 
which differences among producers identities may lead to market partitioning. In particular, I 
claimed that more attention to the multiple dimensions of organizational identities is needed 
to gather a more comprehensive understanding of identity-based market partitioning. The 
results of the current study may be read as providing initial support to the theoretical work of 
Pólos and his colleagues (2010) that underscores although identity contrast between center 
and periphery forms might result from competitive release, oppositional schemas are essential 
to the emergence of a durable market partitioning. The results of this chapter are even more 
appealing when considering the empirical context of my analyses – i.e., a commodity market 
marked by very limited product differentiation.   
Second, but related, this chapter moves the locus of attention of partitioning studies 
from differences among producers (e.g., size, niche width) to the consideration of such 
differences in relation to the cognition and the preferences of audience members. Indeed, the 
majority of research has treated resource partitioning as a uniform process across audience 
segments. The recent studies hint that this might not be the case (Boone, Carroll & Van 
Witteloostujin, 2002; Greve, Pozner & Rao, 2006). In the present study I further contribute to 
this set of findings by mapping the preferences of audience members for the identity claims 
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 of MUs along geographical communities (see Hannan et al., 2007: 302-303). For instance, I 
found that depending on the resonance between producer identity and audience values, 
receptiveness toward identity claims varies across regions, critically influencing identity 
consolidation and partitioning process. By studying audience heterogeneity through the lens 
of geography, I contribute also to the broader theoretical development on organizational 
identity concerning the role of audience structure for vitality rates (see Kocak, Hannan & Hsu 
2010).  
Needless to say, the present chapter is subject to several limitations, which I consider 
as fruitful directions to further develop the project. First, the alignment between theoretical 
propositions and empirical measures may be improved. As mentioned before, the measure of 
oppositional identity (Oppositional Identities) is based on one regional newspaper as a proxy 
for multiple regions. In spite of being a reasonable choice for an early test of my arguments 
(see also the second robustness check), more regional newspapers data should be gathered in 
the near future. Another potential concern involves the measurement of reliability (%Age 
Over50). In this respect, the current variable may be questioned on construct validity grounds 
and the results obtained should be interpreted with care. No doubts, a more appropriate 
measure should be developed in the future. this chapter focuses on founding rates. Last, a 
more complete picture of market partitioning can be gained by studying other vital rates like 
growth or mortality rates. Especially when considering the durability of the market 
partitioning, a study of organizational growth rates appears essential. 
  
68 
 
 Chapter 4 
Growth Rates and Identity-Based Resource Partitioning 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A long standing tradition in organization theory has underscored the role played by 
the external environment in constraining the behavior and the performance of organizations. 
In this respect, the role of resources – both material and symbolic – lies at the core of various 
theoretical efforts (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan, Polos 
& Carroll, 2007). Organization ecologists in particular defined populations as set of 
organizations marked by shared resource dependencies (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). 
According to this view, the growth of an organizational population is constrained by the 
inherent limits of the carrying capacity of its environment (Hannan & Freeman, 1989), and 
the growth and survival of individual organizations by the overlap in terms of resource 
requirements (McPherson, 1983; Baum & Singh, 1994; Podolny et al., 1996). 
The resources available to organizations vary however over the life course of a 
population. The resource partitioning theory originally developed by Carroll (1985), is the 
theory fragment of ecology directly concerned with this matter. As the theory argues, the 
competitive process dictated by economies of scale allows a few generalists to grow larger. 
The very same process leads to the demise of several relatively large organizations which 
releases the resources that allow the flourishing of specialist (i.e., peripheral)  organizations. 
Empirical support for resource partitioning has been obtained from a wide variety of 
industries such as telephone, cooperative banking, airline, beer brewing, wine making, 
newspaper, auditing and car manufacturing (for a review see Carroll, Dobrev & Swaminathan 
2002).  
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 Recent theoretical efforts reframed the mechanism underlying partitioning in terms of 
competitive release (Hannan et al., 2007; Polos, Hannan & Carroll, 2010). In biology, 
competitive release refers to the situation in which a competing species is no longer present 
and its constraint on a surviving population size is removed (Grant, 1972). Albeit central to 
the theory resource partitioning, direct evidence of the mechanism of competitive release 
remains scant. More importantly, recent empirical evidence (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000) 
indicates that identity differences – rather than inertia or scope diseconomies as originally 
argued (Carroll, 1985) -- are critical in predicting which type of organizations will 
appropriate the released resources. Indeed, in the US brewing industry, the success of 
specialist breweries did not rely on a different quality of the output. What mattered was the 
identity of producers: the identity of generalists, perceived as large and modern mass 
producers, turned out to be problematic for a subset of consumers who believed that authentic 
specialty beer should be brewed by a craft-like firm using traditional methods and natural 
ingredients. Organizational identity, rather than product characteristics, guided the 
appropriation of the released resources by specialists organizations and sustained the 
emergence of market partitioning.  
The present chapter builds on the recent development of resource partitioning (Polos 
et al., 2010) to study the growth rates of both center and peripheral organizations upon the 
manifestation of competitive release (i.e., due to the failure of relatively large (near center) 
organizations). I chose to study growth rates because as Carroll and colleagues (2002) 
pointed out, dynamics of growth are both complex and interesting for the theoretical 
development on resource partitioning and therefore worth greater scholarly attention. In 
particular, my goal is twofold. First, to provide evidence about the mechanism of competitive 
release. In this respect I expect competitive release to trigger higher growth rates of 
peripheral organizations than the local subsidiaries of the center (i.e., generalist) 
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 organizations. Second, as the identities of peripheral organizations vary significantly in terms 
of engagement (e.g., Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000) and audience members exhibit 
differences in their preferences (i.e., in the degree to which they find the offering of 
peripheral organizations appealing, see Hannan et al., 2007), heterogeneous growth rates 
among peripheral organizations should be observed. Geographical communities will be 
employed to map the differences in the intrinsic appeal of peripheral organizations.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next part, I develop the theoretical arguments 
and advance testable hypotheses. The third section presents the empirical findings and the 
additional analysis. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of this research and by 
suggesting future improvements of the present study. 
4.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES8 
Competitive Release 
 Recent theoretical developments have emphasized competitive release as the key 
mechanism of partitioning, referring to the “conditions that deliberate a population of 
organizations that had effectively precluded the emergence and growth of a focal population” 
(Hannan et al. 2007: 216; Polos et al., 2010: 4). Resources are released through the demise of 
the near-center producers (NCs) and absorbed by both center (Cs) and peripheral 
                                                            
8 In developing our theoretical arguments I will make use of the qualitative data obtained from four main 
sources. (i) TNS Emnid survey (1999; 2003; 2005; 2009): The telephone surveys have been funded by VKU 
(the trade association for MUs) and carried out by TNS Emnid Market Research. The sample size for the year 
1999, 2003 and 2005 is 500, for 2009 is 1000. (ii) ifm study (2006): This study has been funded by the umbrella 
trade association BDEW (German Association of Energy and Water Industries) and conducted by ifm market 
research institute. The study consists of 60 in-depth interviews with household customers each lasting 1.5 to 2 
hours, carried out by professional psychologists. (iii) BDEW customer surveys (BDEW household customer 
survey, 1999-2009; BDEW commercial customer survey 2000-2009): funded by BDEW and conducted by 
PROMIT Institut fuer Prognose, Marktforschung & Informationstechniken. The sample size is 1200 for 
household customers and 1040 for commercial customers from 13 business areas. (iv). 11 semi-structured in-
depth interviews conducted between 2008 and 2010, each lasting 1 to 2 hours. The interviewees include 6 MU 
managers and department chiefs, industry experts from BDEW and VKU. Three informant have been 
interviewed twice. In addition, I carried out a considerable number of interviews at industrial conferences or via 
telephone as well as extensive research of the German national and local newspaper articles using LexisNexis. 
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 organizations (Ps) 9 . Existing studies have almost exclusively focused on cases in which 
resource partitioning result from high new founding and low mortality rates of Ps (Carroll, 
1985; Lomi, 1995; Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Swaminathan, 2001). As a consequence, 
we know little about the dynamics of organizational growth during partitioning.  
An exception to this trend is the study of Boone and colleagues (2002), which investigates the 
effects of increasing market concentration on the growth rates of regional newspapers. They 
have noticed that generalists (Cs) are best positioned to absorb the newly freed resources. 
One way of achieving this is to acquire the failing NCs and integrate them into the Cs. As a 
result, the few surviving Cs grow larger in size and market concentration increases. As I 
know from the central prediction of resource partitioning theory, increasing market 
concentration boosts the expected fitness of Ps (Carroll, 1985; Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; 
Hannan et al., 2007; Polos et al., 2010). The combined market share of the Cs should also 
shrink in the partitioning process because it is impossible for them to cover such a broad 
range of the market (Carroll, 1985). This implies that in case a small number of Ps start, the 
expansion of the Ps may come from higher growth rates of the incumbents. At the same time, 
increasing concentration and rising contrast between Cs and Ps tilts the competitive balance 
toward organizations built on regional identities (Hannan, 1979; Hannan et al., 2007). As a 
result, for each C, in spite of the expansion of the aggregated organizational size resulting 
from acquisitions, the growth rate of each local subsidiary may decline. Therefore, the 
combined market share of the Cs contracts, in line with the original theory.  
It should become apparent from the previous section that the counterparts of Cs, NCs 
and Ps in the empirical setting are NWUs, regional utilities and MUs. Qualitative evidence in 
the German electricity industry seems to confirm the theoretical predictions. According to 
                                                            
9 Following the most recent theoretical formulation, I use the terms center, near-center and peripheral 
organizations (Hannan et al., 2007; Polos et al., 2010)instead of large generalists, small generalists and 
specialists. 
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 ifm study (ifm 2006), customers nowadays perceive the identities of the NWUs and their 
“own municipal utilities” as distinct and oppositional. As illustrated in Figure 3-1, while the 
large corporations embody the omnipotent, uncontrollable and abstract aspects of electricity, 
the small and medium sized MUs provide to the abstract product of electricity a tangible and 
familiar face, well represented by the drawings of an interviewee in terms of the cosy and 
pleasant everyday life that electricity enables (ifm, 2006).  
Evidence shows that the sympathetic identity of the MUs and the increasing contrast 
between NWUs and MUs indeed helps fuel the MUs’ growth. For example, the MU which is 
owned 100% by the municipality Wedel, started to acquire customers actively in nearby 
Hamburg from April 2007. In Hamburg, the energy market was dominated by two of the 
NWUs’ local subsidiaries: Vattenfall Europe in Hamburg - the decedent of the former 
regional utility HEW and E.ON Hanse - a regional branch of E.ON about 20 times as big as 
the MU Wedel (Zeitung fuer Kommunale Wirtschaft, 2007b). With its expansion into the 
home territories of the NWUs, the MU Wedel intended to “declare battle” against the energy 
giants (vwd Energy Daily, 2007). In the marketing campaign, it emphasizes its image as a 
municipality owned and middle-sized company from the neighborhood, independent from the 
energy giants. This makes the municipal utilities for the Hamburger “already sympathetic”, 
according to the CEO of the MU (taz, 2007). The MU Wedel matched its image with one of 
its newly gained customers- FC St. Pauli, a local soccer club. “Just like I as a small local 
company, the club also has to fight with passion and creativity against the big players with a 
lot money… a David-against-Goliath-situation”, according to the CEO. As a part of the 
campaign, the MU Wedel humorously declared the Hamburg city district St Pauli as “30.000 
Squaremeter Energy free of the Energy Giants” with a symbolic border and a tollkeeper (taz 
2008). The marketing campaign was a success. More than double of the expected number of 
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 customers in Hamburg have switched from E.ON Hanse and Vattenfall Europe to the MU 
Wedel.  
Building on the theoretical arguments discussed above and the qualitative evidence, I 
propose the following hypothesis which juxtaposes the effects of NCs’ demise on the growth 
rates of both Ps and Cs organizations.  
Hypothesis 1. The larger the competitive release the higher the growth rates of MUs 
compared to those of the subsidiaries of NWUs. 
Intrinsic Appeal and Engagement 
 In the former section, I have dealt with the growth prospect of MUs and of local 
branches of NWUs. In this section, I concentrate on MUs, the primary focus of resource 
partitioning theory. As the MU segment, as much as other specialist segments (Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 2000), appears heterogeneous and audience members differ in their 
consideration of MUs identity as appealing, I refer to the theoretical constructs of intrinsic 
appeal and engagement proposed by Hannan and colleagues (2007) to explore the differential 
growth rates of MUs empirically observed. 
Intrinsic Appeal 
Audience holding crucial resources may be represented in a multidimensional social 
(or sociodemographic) space (McPherson, 1983). This concept has been used by Hannan and 
colleagues (2007: 173-180) to develop the notion of intrinsic appeal. Social position refers to 
an audience member’s location in the social space. And social position influences tastes, 
which represent the aesthetics and preferences of audience members. It has been suggested 
that each social position possesses a prototypical taste – i.e., the modal taste of the audience 
members at that position. The intrinsic appeal of an offerings is defined as a match or fit 
between the characteristics of the offer and the typical local taste. Higher intrinsic appeal 
leads to higher actual appeal (Hannan et al., 2007; Hannan, 2010). The relative success of the 
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 producers, can be proxied by the fitness an organization exhibits in a focal environment. 
Fitness refers to “a producer’s ability to thrive within its environment - to obtain necessary 
resources, to persists, and to grow” (Hannan, 2010). Higher intrinsic appeal thus should lead 
to greater organizational fitness – of which growth rate may be a possible example.  
Despite the recent theoretical development on identity and audience, the study of 
heterogeneity among audience segments remains an important but theoretically and 
empirically underdeveloped topic (Hannan et al., 2007; Kocak, Hannan & Hsu 2010). I map 
the heterogeneity of social positions and their corresponding differentiated local tastes using 
geographical communities. In so doing, I rely on Hannan and colleagues (2007: 302) who 
suggested that “a potential valuable extension… of audience segment would consider 
geography. I defined segment as subsets of an audience that are largely closed with respect to 
interaction and communication. Such closure often takes a spatial form: social networks tend 
toward spatial closure. Therefore, audience segments likely to form in spatial patches… 
Perhaps variation over local audience segments in the legitimation of categories also plays a 
role”. These considerations resonate well with those advanced by sociologists, economic 
geographers and other organizational theorists who have underscored the role of geographical 
proximity in sustaining the emergence of collective mindsets (e.g., Gould 1995; Zhao, 1998; 
Hedstrom, 1994; Becattini, 1990; Romanelli & Khessina, 2005). 
Considering intrinsic appeal in terms of matching between MU identity features and 
audience preferences, localness, reliability and environmental friendliness seem to be the 
identity features of the MU identity in our empirical context as mentioned in chapter 3. We 
suggest that the growth rates of MUs should be higher in communities in which the intrinsic 
75 
 
 appeal of their identity is strong. In particular, communities in which localness, reliability and 
greenness are espoused will be a fertile territory for MUs:10 
H2. (Intrinsic Appeal) The greater the MU identity intrinsically appeals to the local 
audience (i.e., the greater the match between the three MU identity features and the 
local audience tastes), the higher the growth rates of MU organizations will be. 
Engagement 
As Hannan and colleagues (2007) argued, to convert intrinsic appeal into fitness, 
producer engagements are required. Engagement refers to producer actions like “(1) learning 
about the idiosyncrasies of the local subaudience and its aesthetics; (2) designing or 
redesigning features of the offering to make it attractive to that audience; and (3) trying to 
establish a favourable identity in the relevant subaudience” (p. 179). In often cases, key 
engagement activities are those developing and displaying credible signals of authenticity and 
commitments towards the claimed identities (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Baron, 2004; 
Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Hannan et al., 2007). For instance, in their study on the American 
microbrewery movement, Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) found that brewpubs send strong 
signals of authenticity and demonstrate high engagements with audience by displaying their 
production equipment in the store-front locations. Therefore, brewpubs seem to contribute 
strongly to the legitimation of the microbreweries. How does engagement influence fitness? 
According to Hannan and colleagues, as long as the intrinsic appeal is nonzero, the fitness of 
an offer to the local audience at a social position increases with the producer’s engagement at 
that position (Hannan et al. 2007: 182). 
                                                            
10 A possible example of the mechanism at work is the following. With the failed regional utilities being 
acquired by the NWUs, the former customers of the acquired regional utilities seem have low attachment and 
little loyalty toward the NWUs. The decreasing loyalty may enable the MUs to grow as visible in the expansion 
of MU Wedel into Hamburg. MU Wedel was careful in managing the differentiated treatment of home 
customers and new customers. In its “home”, the city Wedel, a different marketing strategy was used even the 
same electricity and the same natural gas is sold. The tariffs are titled as “Wedel electricity”, “Wedel natural gas” 
and “Wedel water” respectively, to highlight the local image (Zeitung fuer Kommunale Wirtschaft  2007b). 
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 Producer engagements may take a variety of forms. In this setting, one important form 
of engagement with local audience and to show commitments towards the claimed identity is 
the cooperation with other MUs. As market concentration increased, the Big Four emerges as 
the prominent enemies and substantial threat to the MUs. In an industry where economics of 
scale plays a crucial role for organizational survival, it is difficult for the small and medium-
sized MUs to survive on their own. Thus many experts have predicted a wide death of the 
MUs (Die Welt, 1998; 1999). Due to the traditionally prominent positions of the MUs in 
retail market, the NWUs saw a lucrative partner in the MUs and have attempted to lure the 
MUs to “cooperate” with them. However, many municipal utilities feared a threat to their 
identity. Therefore, they hold as necessary to distance themselves from the Big Four as the 
two types of organizations “have a fundamentally different organizational philosophy and 
mission”, according to the chairman of the VKU (the German MU trade association) group of 
the Land Rheinland-Pfalz (Zeitung fuer Kommunale Wirtschaft, 2007a).  
Therefore, MUs preferred to cooperate with each other. These cooperation activities 
were rooted in their shared identity as municipal enterprises and their responsibility for their 
respective local communities. Cooperation is “to achieve critical size among the like-
minded ”, as the executive chief of Traunstein MU put (Zeitung fuer Kommunale Wirtschaft, 
2006b). As the MUs in Krefeld and in Neuss planned their cooperation with each other, their 
stated goal was “ensuring and extending their market position in the region and the 
maintenance of a customer-near, municipal oriented energy supply” (Energie & Management, 
2006). The mission of the MUs and the municipal cooperation groups is “the development of 
the local economic and living environment for a strong and worth-living region… 
strengthening the economic independent future of the municipal companies in a changing 
energy market”, according to the mission statement of KOS- a cooperation group of 14 
municipal utilities from Upper Bavaria and Swabia (KOS Web site). The municipal 
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 cooperation groups see in themselves “Robin Hood against the Big Four” (Zeitung fuer 
Kommunale Wirtschaft, 2006a). Another example is the MU cooperation SüdWestStrom. 
Over 60 regional MUs declared their areas as “EnBW (one of the Big Four)-free” zone and 
formed the cooperation group to support each other to remain competitive and independent of 
NWUs (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2008). The members of the cooperation group supported the 
local communities through sponsoring local events, engaging in collective campaigns meant 
to underscore their care for local citizens, and more importantly, collectively building 
environmental friendly power generation capacities (SüdWestStrom home page).  
Based on the above theoretical arguments together with empirical evidence and 
focusing on growth rate as the indicator for organizational fitness, I propose: 
Hypothesis 3 (Engagement in form of cooperation). The more credible a MU’s 
engagement , the higher its growth rate will be. 
4.3 DATA AND METHODS 
Data Source 
 To test the hypotheses, I have collected three sets of quantitative data. The first data 
set concerns the annual electricity retail sales to end users of 1998 and from 2001 to 2008. 
The data were primarily obtained from the BDEW annual data publication (BDEW 
Jahresdaten der Stromversorger, 1998, 2001-2008). As the umbrella trade association for the 
German electricity and water industry, BDEW’s (previously VDEW) members represent over 
90% of the electricity retail market share (BDEW home page) and include almost all the 
NWUS and MUs. Since there existed no data for the year 1999 and 2000, linear interpolation 
was used to fill the missing years. The data was then verified using information from the data 
banks Hoppenstedt and the German company register (Bundesanzeiger) as well as 
information from firm web page whenever possible. The final data set consists of 573 MUs 
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 and 15 subsidiaries of NWUs in the German electricity industry, covering about 80% of the 
entire population of NWUs and MUs. To account for audience heterogeneity, I collected data 
from the German Federal Statistical Office Web Site which contains the socio-demographic 
statistics of the 439 counties in Germany (the city of Hamburg and Berlin are two of the 16 
German federal states and considered here as county as well). The coverage of the data 
ranges from 1997 to 2007, depending on the variables. The information on MU cooperation 
activities was obtained from the data collected by BDEW and VKU. I have double-checked 
and complemented the data with the information gathered from the home pages of the MUs 
and the cooperation groups as well as from German national and local newspaper articles 
using LexisNexis.  
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
 Our dependent variable is organizational growth. I measure Size using the retail sales 
of electricity to end users in MWh (megawatt hour). Other common size measures are annual 
revenues and number of employees (see, e.g., Khaire, 2010). Annual revenues from 
electricity retail sales is not feasible here because the electricity prices showed great volatility 
over time. Number of employees turned out to be not suitable in this context because the 
MUs usually have other business areas such as gas, water, heating and the allocation of the 
employees to the different business areas is difficult to observe.  
Independent Variables 
Competitive Release. The variable Competitive Release was calculated as the 
aggregated size of the failed regional utilities in a given year. Since many regional utilities 
are missing in the later years of the BDEW data, I used the size of regional utilities in the 
1998 data. To test Hypothesis 1 that MUs exhibit higher growth rates than the subsidiaries of 
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 the NWUs, I interacted Competitive Release with the dummy variable MU which is coded as 
1 if the focal firm is an MU and 0 if it is a subsidiary of the NWUs 
(CompetitiveReleaseXMU).  
Intrinsic Appeal. To test Hypothesis 2, a variable that measures the extent to which 
the values incorporated in the MU identity are traceable in the local community was needed. 
Remember that localness, reliability and environmental friendliness are the three MU identity 
features emerged from the qualitative evidence. To proxy Localness, I employed the voter 
turnout in county elections. Regions where people care more about the development and 
well-being of the local communities exhibit higher voter turnout. The higher the voter turnout, 
the greater the fit with MU’s localness. Since county elections are held every 5 years, the 
missing years have been filled in by using linear interpolation. As for Reliability, I employed 
the proportion of people over the age of 50. Older people are more risk averse and thus put 
more emphasis on reliability of electricity supply. The qualitative evidence confirms this 
claim. I measured Greenness with the proportion of people in a district voting for the German 
Green Party in the Bundestag (the lower house of the parliament at the federal level) election. 
Measuring this construct by using county elections may distort the picture as the Green Party 
do not have a candidate in every region. Bundestag elections are held every four years and 
linear interpolation was used for filling in the missing years.  
Engagement. Engagement in forms of cooperation activities among MUs took 
different forms (Zeitung fuer Kommunale Wirtschaft , 2001; Energie & Management, 2005; 
Energie & Management, 2008b). Shortly after deregulation, most cooperation agreements 
were inspired by economic reasoning such as collective purchasing electricity in order to 
increase their collective bargaining power. This form of cooperation is flexible and loose, 
requiring little commitment and trust. Cooperation activities of collective purchasing and 
trading were thus labelled Economic Engagement. The second category of cooperation 
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 activities took the form of collective marketing and sales. These activities represent 
commitment to the form identity of MUs because they present MUs as a group sharing a 
collective identity to the audience. I thus labelled these activities as Form Identity 
Engagement. Before the deregulation, there existed “division of labor” among the electricity 
firms on the national, regional and municipal levels in the (West) German electricity industry. 
The nationwide firms with large-scale power plants generated electricity and sold it to the 
regional utilities; regional utilities then distributed to municipal utilities which then sell to 
end customers11 (FES 1991, Brandt 2006, Krisp 2007). The result of this division of labour 
was that the MUs had very little own generation capacity, which became a liability when they 
tried to preserve their independence from the NWUs in a deregulated market (Energie & 
Management, 2005; Energie & Management, 2008b). To preserve their local identity and 
independence, a few MUs engaged in building collective power plants and started to share 
the generation capacity among themselves. This form of cooperation represents the most 
genuine commitment to the MU identity, thus I labelled it Local Independence Engagement. 
Note that the categories Economic Engagement, Form Identity Engagement and Local 
Independence Engagement are not mutually exclusive as MUs may at the same time engage 
in different cooperation activities such as collective purchasing, marketing or power plants. 
For each cooperation category, a dummy variable is used, coded as 1 if the focal MU engages 
in the cooperation activities within that category and 0 otherwise. The years in which MUs 
were not engaged in any type of cooperation were coded as Zero Engagement. All 
independent variables were lagged of 1 year to control for reverse causality. 
Control Variables 
The following firm-level control variables were included. I control for Age because a 
few studies have found that the proportional growth rate of firms decreases with age 
                                                            
11 Besides their respective functions as generators and distributors, both NWUs and regional utilities also served 
end customers in their respective monopoly regions.  
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 (Harrison 2004). The missing values for Age have been filled using the mean value. Since 
firm diversification may influence how aggressively it competes in the focal market (Chen, 
1996; Greve, 2008b), I control for the number of Business Areas in which the firm is active in 
12. Moreover, geographical proximity of a firm (Proximity to Released Resources) to the 
failed regional utilities (i.e., to the released resources) may influence its growth. Thus I 
control for the distance an MU or an NWU subsidiary i to a failed regional utilities j by 
applying the “Great Circle Distance Formula” : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]clongclongclatclatclatclatrDist ijjijiij //cos/cos/cos/sin/sincos 1 −+= −  
with r denoting the radius of the earth in kilometres and c being a constant of 180/π which is 
necessary in order to convert latitude or longitude from decimal degrees to radians. The 
latitude and longitude of each firm has been obtained from “Google Map” using the function 
“LatLng Tooltip” in “Maps Labs” (see also Beck et al., 2010). In a second step, I weighted 
the distance with the size of the failed regional utilities to calculate the Proximity to Released 
Resources: 
ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ ܲݎ݋ݔ݅௜ ൌ ෍
ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁
ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௝
 
Several environmental controls were included in the models as well. I controlled for 
MU density at the district level (MU Density District) as density might be negatively linked 
to firm growth as found by Barnett and Carroll (1987). Furthermore, I controlled for 
population per sqkm (Population Density) because population density tend to increase 
electricity retail sales. More densely populated areas are considered in the industry as “fillet 
pieces” which are more profitable (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2010). Whereas population 
density takes household customer density into consideration, I also controlled for the density 
                                                            
12 As stated before, most of the MUs have more business areas than electricity. Many MUs also provide 
products like water, heating, gas and run the local public transport and sport facilities. 
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of industrial customers with the number of industry firms per district-year (Industrial Firm 
Density). In addition, I also controled for municipal debt level (Municipal Debt) and average 
disposal income per person (Disposable Income) in the focal area. All the above control 
variables have been lagged of one year. The Municipal Debt variable was log-transformed as 
its distribution was highly skewed. Furthermore, I controlled for whether the MU is located in 
formal East Germany (East). After reunification in 1990, many communities re-founded their 
MUs. Lastly, I controlled for the first period after deregulation from 1998 to 2000 (1998-
2000) during which the competitive dynamics turned out to be significantly different from the 
later years. Table 4-1 and 4-2 present the descriptives and the bivariate correlations of the 
variables used in the models 
 
 TABLE 4-1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Growth Rates of German Electricity Firms 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Size 5684.00 453990.70 1989663.00 0.00 80200000.00
Lagged Size 5683.00 453923.60 1989831.00 0.00 80200000.00
Competitive Release 7056.00 8363059.00 11900000.00 1.00 30700000.00
MU 7056.00 0.97 0.16 0.00 1.00
Localness 6351.00 0.57 0.08 0.32 0.81
Reliability 6445.00 0.37 0.03 0.27 0.50
Greeness 6899.00 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.23
Zero Engagement 7056.00 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Economic Engagement 7056.00 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Form Identity Engagement 7056.00 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
Local Independence Engagement 7056.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Age 7056.00 65.35 42.24 0.00 157.00
Business Areas 6948.00 4.12 1.51 1.00 8.00
Proximity of Released Resources 7055.00 54156.46 405436.10 0.03 21600000.00
MU Density 7056.00 23.30 10.45 0.00 43.00
Population Density 6412.00 436.34 590.06 38.72 4225.43
Industry firm Density 6448.00 131.88 99.85 11.00 985.00
Municipal Debt 6372.00 224073.40 306663.00 0.00 3414334.00
Disposable Income 6226.00 16590.20 2236.41 10819.00 25928.00
East 7056.00 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
1998-2000 7056.00 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
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 TABLE 4-2 
Bivariate Correlations for the Growth Rates of German Electricity Firms 
Size 
Lag.  
Size 
Comp. 
Release MU Localn. Reliabil. Greenn.
Zero 
Engag.
Econ. 
Engag.
Form 
Identity 
Engag. 
Local 
Indep 
Engag. Age 
Busin. 
Areas 
Proxi. 
to 
Releas. 
Resourc.
MU 
Density
Pop. 
Density
Indus. 
firm 
Density
Munic.
Debt 
Dispos. 
income East 
1998-
2000 
Size 1.00 
Lagged Size 0.91 1.00 
Competitive Release -0.02 -0.02 1.00
MU -0.63 -0.57 0.01 1.00
Localness -0.18 -0.15 0.10 0.10 1.00
Reliability 0.04 0.04 -0.20 -0.02 -0.38 1.00
Greenness 0.22 0.18 -0.10 -0.11 -0.25 -0.26 1.00
Zero Engagement 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.12 -0.16 0.11 -0.02 1.00
Economic Engagement -0.10 -0.09 -0.04 0.11 0.26 -0.14 0.03 -0.88 1.00
Form Identity 
Engagement -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 0.12 0.18 -0.11 0.02 -0.99 0.86 1.00 
Local Independence 
Engagement -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.21 0.18 -0.39 0.44 0.39 1.00
Age -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.13 -0.18 0.31 -0.17 0.25 0.18 0.09 1.00
Business Areas -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.08 -0.09 0.16 -0.16 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.23 1.00
Proximity to Released 
Resources 0.06 0.05 0.15 -0.19 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 1.00
MU Density -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.13 -0.19 0.21 0.21 0.06 0.07 -0.09 -0.03 1.00
Population Density 0.47 0.39 0.01 -0.24 -0.40 0.07 0.47 0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.01 1.00
Industrial firm Density 0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.15 -0.21 0.30 0.10 -0.09 -0.10 0.08 0.10 -0.04 0.04 -0.12 0.18 1.00
Municipal Debt 0.35 0.28 0.00 -0.20 -0.20 -0.03 0.33 0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.10 0.60 0.48 1.00
Disposable Income 0.08 0.06 -0.20 -0.04 0.00 -0.10 0.57 -0.08 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.38 0.05 -0.02 0.17 0.23 0.41 0.19 1.00 
East -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.29 0.42 -0.47 0.24 -0.31 -0.25 -0.18 -0.56 -0.14 -0.02 -0.15 -0.11 -0.26 -0.12 -0.56 1.00 
1998-2000 -0.04 -0.03 0.44 0.01 0.20 -0.30 -0.13 0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.30 -0.01 1.00 
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 Model Specification 
 One of the most commonly used models for growth is the Gibrat’s model, which 
assumes size-independent growth (but see Barnett & Carroll, 1987; Barron, West & Hannan, 
1995). Following previous studies (e.g. Sorensen, 1999; Greve, 2008), I model the firm 
growth rates as a function of a firm’s size and a number of covariates characterising 
organizational and environmental features: 
௜ܵ,௧ାଵ
௜ܵ௧
ൌ ௜ܵ௧
ఈିଵ݁ݔ݌൫ߚݔ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ାଵ൯ 
where S is firm size, α is an adjustment parameter indicating the dependence of growth rates 
on size, and β is a vector of parameter characterizing how the organizational and 
environmental covariates influence growth.  
 By transforming the equation to its natural logarithm, I obtain the following log-linear 
model which can be estimated using linear regression: 
݈݊൫ ௜ܵ,௧ାଵ൯ ൌ ߙ lnሺ ௜ܵ௧ሻ ൅  ߚݔ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ାଵ 
 We use GEE models to estimate the growth rates for two reasons. First, the 
hypotheses point to between firm comparison rather than within firm comparison. Second, 
some variables are hardly time variant over the short period under study. By using GEE 
models, I are able to take both between and within effects into consideration. An 
exchangeable correlation matrix was employed. Robust standard errors are reported. 
4.4 RESULTS 
 Table 4-3 shows the estimates of the GEE models for the growth rates of the German 
electricity firms from 1998 to 2008. Model 1 shows the base line model, which contains the 
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control variables. The estimates obtained for the control variables are as expected: the 
previous year’s size (Lagged Size) has a strong positive effect on the current year’s size and 
the proximity weighted by the size of the failed regional utilities (Proximity to Released 
Resources) also increases organizational growth. Population Density exhibits a positive and 
significant effect on organizational growth, whereas Industrial Firm Density shows the 
expected positive effect but fails to reach significance. As expected, the first period after 
deregulation (1999-2000) has a positive and significant effect on growth rates.  
 Model 2 shows the main effect of Hypothesis 1. As I can see, the size of released 
resource exhibits on average a positive and significant effect on the growth rates of all the 
organizations included in the sample – i.e., on both subsidiaries of NWUs and MUs. In model 
3 I find evidence in support of H1, which suggests that under resource release, MUs will 
grow faster than the subsidiaries of NWUs. As expected, the estimate of the interaction term 
CompetitiveReleaseXMU is positive and significant, suggesting that for every 107 MWh 
released resources (sales of electricity to end customers by failed regional utilities), MUs 
enjoy 6% higher growth rate than the NWUs. 
 Whereas the data for testing H1 includes both the NWUs and MUs, the data set for 
testing H2 and H3 contains only MUs as I are interested in knowing which of them is better 
positioned to tap into the released resources. Model 4 tests Hypothesis 2 that intrinsic appeal 
of the MU category identity will increase the growth rates of MUs. Contrary to my 
expectations, the two dimensions of MU identity Reliability and Greenness exhibit a negative 
and significant effect on the organizational growth of MUs. Localness also exhibits a 
negative effect on MU growth rates. Although the negative effect of Localness is not 
significant in this Model 4, it becomes significant in the full model (Model 9). H2 therefore is 
not supported. In the next section, I conduct additional analysis to further explore this issue.  
 TABLE 4-3 
GEE Models of Growth Rates of the German Electricity Firms, 1998-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Base  
Model 
 H1 
 
H2 
 
H3 
 
H3 
 
H3 
 
H3 Full  
Model 
          
Lagged Size 0.98654** 0.98775** 0.98773** 0.98121** 0.98121** 0.98142** 0.98121** 0.98097** 0.98220** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Competitive Release x10-7  0.0149* -0.0433       
  (0.000) (0.000)       
MU  0.03453 -0.02014       
  (0.036) (0.022)       
Competitive ReleaseXMU x10-7   0.0589*       
   (0.000)       
Localness (Intrinsic Appeal)    -0.07564 -0.07512 -0.08571 -0.07436 -0.06389 -0.09984† 
    (0.063) (0.063) (0.060) (0.063) (0.064) (0.052) 
Reliability (Intrinsic Appeal)    -0.37357** -0.37849** -0.36522** -0.37996** -0.33552** -0.38323** 
    (0.096) (0.098) (0.097) (0.098) (0.096) (0.104) 
Greenness (Intrinsic Appeal)    -0.33535* -0.34215* -0.31281* -0.34459* -0.35267* -0.34851* 
    (0.140) (0.146) (0.137) (0.146) (0.142) (0.144) 
Zero Engagement     0.00336     
     (0.006)     
Economic Engagement      0.01294*   0.06120† 
      (0.006)   (0.032) 
Form Identity Engagement       -0.00500  -0.05880† 
       (0.006)  (0.032) 
Local Independence Engagement        0.01805* 0.01221† 
        (0.007) (0.007) 
Age -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00005 0.00015 0.00015 0.00013 0.00015 0.00015 0.00010 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Business Areas 0.00180 0.00121 0.00119 0.00207 0.00221 0.00161 0.00225 0.00207 0.00197 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Proximity to Released Resources 0.00215** -0.00106 -0.00099 0.00225* 0.00223* 0.00229* 0.00222* 0.00227* 0.00213* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MU Density -0.00019 -0.00019 -0.00018 0.00012 0.00015 0.00003 0.00016 0.00010 0.00016 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
88 
 
 89 
 
Population Density 0.00002† 0.00002* 0.00002* 0.00004** 0.00004** 0.00004** 0.00004** 0.00004** 0.00004** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industrial Firm Density 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00010 0.00010 0.00011 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Municipal Debt 0.00300 0.00302 0.00302 0.00240 0.00230 0.00292 0.00219 0.00339 0.00307 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Disposable Income -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
East 0.00555 0.00478 0.00487 0.02590† 0.02483† 0.03001* 0.02426† 0.02671† 0.02659† 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
1998-2000 0.01807* 0.00973 0.01004 0.01901** 0.01818* 0.02142** 0.01778* 0.01961** 0.01633* 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Constant 0.08515 0.04798 0.10069 0.30944** 0.31138** 0.29649** 0.31743** 0.28281** 0.32347** 
 (0.066) (0.085) (0.079) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.110) (0.108) (0.110) 
Observations 4,702 4,702 4,702 4,305 4,305 4,305 4,305 4,305 4,305 
Number of firm 554 554 554 533 533 533 533 533 533 
          
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
 Model 5 to 8 are meant to test Hypothesis 3 by adding the four categories of 
cooperation agreements one by one. As expected, Zero Engagement has no effect on the 
growth rates as indicated by Model 5. Cooperation activities of collective purchasing and 
trading (Economic Engagement) exhibit a positive and significant effect on MU growth rates 
as reported in model 6. Whereas I do not find any significant effect of cooperation activities 
such as marketing and sales (Form identity Engagement) in Model 7, a positive and 
significant effect of Local independence engagement is illustrated by Model 8. Whereas 
Form Identity Engagement stresses the collective identity of MUs, Local Independence 
Engagement accentuates the responsibility towards local communities. Local Independence 
Engagement therefore might be perceived as a more credible commitment to local audiences. 
Note that the effect of Local independence engagement (Model 8) is stronger than that of 
Economic Engagement (Model 6) – but see the full model as well. By and large, I interpret 
this trend of findings as providing support to Hypothesis 313.  
Additional Analysis 
The surprising results concerning H2 seems to indicate that communities in which the 
match between the characteristics of the MU identity and the local audience tastes is high, 
intrinsic appeal constrains organizational growth. Empirical evidence seems to indicate that 
size correlates with organizational identity. For example, in both the studies on the U.S. 
brewery (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000) and wine (Swaminathan 2001), size was used to 
categorize center (mass producers), near-center (regional producers) and peripheral 
(specialists) organizations. “There is a certain mystique to smallness” and a legitimated craft 
beer not only should use traditional methods and natural ingredients, but also should be 
                                                            
13 One might raise the point that the Local Independence Engagement represents investment in new capacity. 
Thus it is not surprising that this should boost growth. I do not think this alternative explanation holds here. As 
distribution firms, in order to grow, it is much easier for the MUs to buy electricity from the wholesale market 
than to undertake such high risk in building their own generation capacity. Also for this reason, only a minority 
of the MUs engage in this type of cooperation. As mentioned before, their goal is to become genuinely 
independent from the Big Four controlling the most generation capacity and preserve their local identity. 
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 brewed in a craft-like small firm (Carroll & Swaminathan 2001). Growth may challenge the 
authenticity of peripheral organizations. In a case study on a U.S. microbrewery- the 
Mendocino Brewing Company (Harrington, Barnett & Carroll, 1995) - the growth strategy 
employed was thought to be risky for the preservation of the image of “small” producer. 
Similarly, in a study on the U.S. wine industry, Swaminathan (2001) warns that excessive 
growth may make it hard for a farm winery to capitalize on its identity of local firm.  
It seems that the mystique of smallness holds true also in this empirical setting and 
that local audiences who are sympathetic to the MU identity features demonstrate strong 
resistance against the expansion of their local MUs. Indeed, the ifm psychological study 
(2006) shows that the MUs following an aggressive growth strategy by acquiring customers 
outside of the local community are perceived as “cold expansionists”. The local customers 
“cannot identify themselves with the new size of their MUs”. The potential changes 
necessary for growth might be perceived by local citizens as “too cold” or “too businesslike”. 
In this way, the expansion of MUs in the direction of the “Big Ones” may be at risk of losing 
its cosy and familial identity – see also Figure 3-1. The abovementioned study identifies this 
as the “uprooting” problem and warns that expansion will be paid with considerable loss in 
the home territory due to “decreasing identification” of the local customers.  
Combining the results of this growth study with the previous study of founding rates, 
an interesting picture emerges. The results of the current study indicate that the MUs 
embedded in communities exhibiting a greater match between the MU identity features and 
the local audience tastes tend to grow less. Conversely, the previous study shows that MU 
founding rates increase in regions where audience preferences exhibit a greater match with 
the MU identity features. This picture appears aligned with the considerations of Carroll and 
his colleagues (Carroll et al., 2002) that the strong boundaries which protect the peripheral 
organizations from the competition of market center producers also “imposes strong 
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 constraints on growth, even when founding rates are high”. In other words, resource 
partitioning seems to take place either through new foundings or through the growth of 
incumbent MUs, depending on the strength of the MUs’ intrinsic appeal. In regions where the 
intrinsic appeal of the MUs is strong, resource partitioning and the growth of the peripheral 
organizations occurs at the form level through new foundings. In regions where the MU 
intrinsic appeal is low, resource partitioning and the growth of the peripheral organizations 
takes place at the firm level through the growth of incumbent MUs.  
As intrinsic appeal seems to constrain organizational growth, the next question 
concerns whether engagement interacts with intrinsic appeal to improve organizational fitness, 
reflected in growth rates. According to Polos and colleagues (2010), sustained high 
engagement may help partly overcome the limits of intrinsic appeal. I thus speculate that 
engagements closely related to the MU identity may help reducing the negative effect of 
intrinsic appeal on organizational growth. Here I conduct an exploratory analysis by splitting 
the data set according to the four engagement categories and test how the three dimensions of 
intrinsic appeal behave across the different types of engagement.  
Table 4-4 reports the results of this exploratory analysis. Notice that the negative 
effects of Localness and Reliability remain significant when considering Zero Engagement 
and Economic Engagement. Nonetheless, such negative effects weaken when considering 
Form Identity Engagement and Local Independence Engagement. In other words, credible 
engagement and commitment to local audiences does help to reduce the constraints which 
intrinsic appeal impose on organizational growth.  
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 TABLE 4-4 
Additional Analysis  
GEE Models of Growth Rates of the German Electricity Firms, 1998-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Zero 
Engagement 
Economic 
Engagement 
Form Identity 
Engagement 
Local Independence 
Engagement 
     
Lagged Size 0.98703** 0.98286** 0.98578** 0.98076** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Localness -0.10669† -0.10494† 0.09064 -0.20103 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.116) (0.130) 
Reliability -0.27642* -0.28633* -0.21013 -0.33665 
 (0.117) (0.126) (0.133) (0.319) 
Greenness -0.24448 -0.07600 -0.21410 -0.30962 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.192) (0.227) 
Age -0.00000 -0.00003 0.00029 -0.00015 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Business Areas 0.00106 0.00330 0.00308 0.00758† 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Proximity to Released Resources 0.00089 0.00202** 0.00356** 0.00086 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MU Density -0.00016 -0.00007 0.00053 0.00079 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population Density 0.00003 0.00002† 0.00005** 0.00005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industrial Firm Density -0.00001 0.00006 0.00033* 0.00007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Municipal Debt 0.00866 0.01070† -0.01101 0.00906 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) 
Disposable Income 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
East 0.00072 0.03977* 0.06736* -0.07361 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.029) (0.051) 
1998-2000 0.00888 0.02541* 0.03359** 0.00737 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) 
Constant 0.18749 0.20134* 0.21705† 0.39058* 
 (0.123) (0.101) (0.112) (0.181) 
Observations 2,196 1,817 2,074 531 
Number of firm 322 240 283 79 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing inspiration from a few limitations of the existing research on market 
partitioning (Carroll, 1985; Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000) and relying on recent 
development in organization ecology (Hannan et al., 2007), the present chapter aimed at 
improving our understanding of the processes of identity-based partitioning by focusing on 
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 organizational growth rates. To reach this goal, I followed a research design that combines 
qualitative and quantitative evidence. The empirical tests were carried out by using data 
during the period of 1998 to 2008 from the German electricity industry.  
Although firms in market center may absorb the majority of the released resources 
through acquiring the failed near-center producers, resource release leads to higher 
organizational growth rates of peripheral organizations compared with those of the 
subsidiaries of the center firms. Contrary to my prediction, greater match between 
organizational identity and the local audience tastes (intrinsic appeal) limited organizational 
growth. Combining with the findings in the previous study on founding rates, an interesting 
picture of resource partitioning arises. Whereas resource partitioning occurs mainly at the 
form level through new foundings in regions in which peripheral organizations exhibit 
substantial intrinsic appeal, organizational growth rates drive partitioning in locations in 
which the intrinsic appeal of peripheral organizations is limited. In addition, I also found that 
engagement improves organizational growth rates both in a direct and in an indirect way – 
i.e., both by boosting growth rates and by reducing the negative effects of intrinsic appeal on 
organizational growth.  
This chapter contributes to research on resource partitioning theory and to the 
organizational identity literature as follows. First, to the best my knowledge, this study 
represents the first empirical test of the mechanism of resource release – and partly responds 
to the call of Hannan and colleagues’ (2007: 227) for innovative empirical tests of 
partitioning that depart from concentration. Moreover, the present study shows that identity 
driven resource partitioning unfolds in complex ways. In particular, I claim that identity-
based resource partitioning may occur both at the form level and at the organizational level, 
depending on the strength of intrinsic appeal of the organizational form of peripheral 
organizations. The same factors stimulating new entries may turn out to impede 
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 organizational growth. Of course, the specificity of the context under study and of the identity 
of MUs may be responsible for the findings obtained here. Needless to say, the 
generalizability of these consideration should be proved in other empirical settings. 
Nonetheless, the findings indicate that more attention to the distinct dynamics of 
organizational growth driving resource partitioning is needed, in order to gather a more 
comprehensive understanding of resource partitioning processes (see Carroll et al., 2002).  
Second, and related, this chapter moves the locus of attention of partitioning studies 
from differences among producers (e.g., size, niche width) to the consideration of such 
differences in relation to the cognition and the preferences of audience members. Indeed, the 
majority of research has treated resource partitioning as a rather uniform process across 
audience segments. Recent empirical efforts suggest that this might not be the case (Boone, 
Carroll & Van Witteloostujin, 2002; Greve, Pozner & Rao, 2006). In the present study I 
further contribute to this on-going discussion by mapping the heterogeneity of audience 
preferences along geographical communities (see also Hannan et al., 2007: 302-303). By 
studying audience heterogeneity through the lens of geography, I contribute also to the 
broader theoretical development on organizational identity concerning the role of audience 
structure for organizational vital rates (see Kocak, Hannan & Hsu 2010). 
The present chapter is subject to several limitations, which I consider as fruitful 
directions for further development of this research. First, the current coding of engagement 
categories in form of cooperation is rough. Thus the effects of Economic Engagement may 
mainly come from Local Independence Engagement as mentioned. To better disentangle the 
effects of the different degrees of engagement I should improve the current coding. Second, 
the robustness of the results should be further checked. For example, by acquiring the failed 
regional utilities, NWUs have carried out substantial reorganization activities, which might 
have adverse effects on organizational growth rates. I intend to continue working on 
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robustness checks and ruling out alternative explanations. Third, to further check the validity 
of the results, more controls should be added to the models. For example, the NWUs held 
minority shares in some MUs which might change the audience’s perception of the identity of 
these MUs and subsequently affect their growth rates. In summary, the current chapter 
reports the first findings of my analyses which need to be improved in the near future. 
 Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation has examined identity-based resource partitioning with quantitative, 
simulation and qualitative evidence in the context of the German electricity market after 
deregulation in 1998. I studied partitioning by applying insights from the recent theoretical 
development on organizational identity, paying special attention to the roles of audience 
heterogeneity which is observed through the lens of geography. I have investigated the 
process of identity-based partitioning and explored the boundary conditions for sustainable 
partitioning (chapter 2), how opposite producer identities and the match between peripheral 
identity with audience tastes affect partitioning in terms of founding rates (chapter 3), and 
how resource release and the match between identity and tastes influences partitioning in 
terms of organizational growth rates (chapter 4). This dissertation contributes to resource 
partitioning theory and research on organizational identity as well as to research on industry 
evolution and sociology of the market in general. In the following sections, I summarize the 
main findings and propose future research.  
5.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
 Chapter 2: Identity Processes and Resource Partitioning 
 Chapter 2 sets the stage for the dissertation by detailing the process of identity-based 
partitioning through a formal model and generating testable hypotheses from simulation 
experiments. The results revealed the conditions that sustain an identity oppositional to that 
of market leaders. The sharpness of the broadcasted identity, as well as the relative 
receptiveness of audience members to its associated claims, significantly affect the likelihood 
of market partitioning. 
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 The results obtained extend resource partitioning theory and organizational identity 
research in several ways. First, departing from the original formulation of partitioning 
(Carroll 1985) which relies on structural inertia and product differentiation, the results 
indicated that oppositional identities may lead to market partitioning as well. Second, I 
explored the process through which an oppositional identity is claimed and becomes crisp in 
the eyes of audience members with specific reference to the three boundary conditions: (i) 
intense cooperation among peripheral organizations, (ii) substantial audience heterogeneity 
and (iii) timing, i.e. how quickly audience perceives the producer identity claim and to which 
extent this delay is coordinated with that on the side of producers. Following a competitive 
threat, short delays both on the producer and the audience side enable peripheral 
organizations to gain steady market share. On the contrary, long delays impedes the 
emergence of the oppositional identity, which is critical to buffer peripheral organizations 
from the competition from market leaders. As a result, market partitioning may be prevented 
(for a similar logic see Pólos et al., 2010). Third, this chapter also contributes to research on 
organizational identities. An increasing number of studies on categorical contrast demonstrate 
that upon the emergence of contrast identities organizations are rewarded for displaying clear, 
unambiguous identities (e.g., Hsu, 2006; Hsu et al., 2009; Zuckerman, 1999, Ruef & 
Patterson 2009; Negro et al., 2007). However, categories are considered as exogenous in 
most existing studies (But see Carroll & Swaminathan 2000; Rao et al., 2005). Thus we know 
little about where does contrast come from? Here I treated market deregulation which leads to 
increasing market concentration as an exogenous trigger of contrast. However, the results of 
the simulation experiments hinted that an exogenous shock is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the success of an oppositional identity: cooperation is needed to align the efforts 
of peripheral organizations and, thus, to sharpen their collective identity. Last, and not 
specific to this chapter, this dissertation extends the applicability of resource partitioning to 
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 markets with homogeneous products. I have shown that the existence of different identities 
may lead to market partitioning, even in case of commodity products. In doing so, this 
dissertaion contributes to shifting the focus of resource partitioning theory from economic 
arguments to sociological and cultural ones.  
 Chapter 3: Founding Rates and Identity-Based Resource Partitioning 
Building on chapter 2, chapter 3 empirically tested the claim that increasing 
oppositional identities upon competitive release lead to resource partitioning and investigated 
the effect of heterogeneous audience preferences on partitioning. I found that the more the 
identities of peripheral and center organizations are perceived as oppositional, the larger the 
founding rates of the peripheral organizations. However, this effect varies substantially across 
audience segments. Looking closer at audience heterogeneity through the lens of geography, I 
suggested that with greater resonance (or match) between the peripheral identity features and 
the values endorsed by the local community, founding rates of peripheral organizations also 
increase. I also found that consistency between identity claims and producer actions as 
perceived by the local audience further sustains partitioning.  
This chapter contributes to the research on resource partitioning theory and 
organizational identities in the following ways. First, the results of chapter 3 may be read as 
providing initial support to the theoretical work of Pólos and his colleagues (2010) that 
underscores although identity contrast between center and periphery forms might result from 
competitive release, oppositional schemas are essential to the emergence of a durable market 
partitioning. This study outlined the process through which differences among producers 
identities may lead to market partitioning. In particular, I proposed that in order to gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of identity-based market partitioning, more attention to 
the multiple dimensions of organizational identity such as contrast, resonance and empirical 
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 credibility is needed. Second, but related, this study moves the focus of partitioning studies 
away from differences among producers (e.g., size, niche width) toward the consideration of 
such differences in relation to the cognition and the preferences of audience members. The 
traditional research has treated resource partitioning as a uniform process across audience 
segments. The recent studies hint that this might not be the case (Boone, Carroll & Van 
Witteloostujin, 2002; Greve, Pozner & Rao, 2006). This chapter further contributes to this 
stream of research by mapping the preferences of audience members for the identity claims of 
peripheral organizations along geographical communities (see Hannan et al., 2007: 302-303). 
For instance, I found that depending on the resonance (or match) between producer identity 
and audience values, audience receptiveness toward identity claims varies across regions, 
critically influencing identity consolidation and partitioning process. By studying audience 
heterogeneity in terms of geographical regions, this chapter also contributes to the broader 
research on organizational identity concerning the role of audience structure on 
organizational vitality (see Kocak, Hannan & Hsu 2010).  
 Chapter 4: Growth Rates and Identity-Based Resource Partitioning 
Building on chapter 2 and 3, chapter 4 empirically examined the direct effects of 
competitive release on partitioning. By applying the concepts of intrinsic appeal and 
engagement (Hannan et al., 2007), this chapter not only further investigated the effects of 
audience heterogeneity in terms of geography on partitioning, but also looked into the 
influence of producer cooperation - another boundary condition as determined in chapter 2. I 
found that although center organizations may absorb the majority of the released resources, 
resource release leads to higher organizational growth rates of peripheral organizations 
compared with those of the subsidiaries of the center ones. Contrary to my prediction, greater 
match between organizational identity and the local audience tastes (intrinsic appeal) limited 
organizational growth. Combining with the findings in chapter 3 on founding rates, an 
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 interesting picture of resource partitioning emerges. Whereas resource partitioning occurs 
mainly at the form level through new foundings in regions where the match between 
peripheral identity form and local audience tastes is high, organizational growth rates drive 
partitioning in locations where the match is limited. In addition, I also found that engagement 
(in form of cooperation among peripheral organizations) enhances organizational growth 
rates both in a direct and in an indirect way – i.e., both by boosting growth rates and by 
reducing the negative effects of intrinsic appeal on organizational growth.  
This chapter contributes to the resource partitioning research and to the organizational 
identity literature as follows. First, to the best of my knowledge, this chapter represents the 
first empirical test of resource release. In doing so, I also followed the suggestion of Hannan 
and colleagues’ (2007: 227) for innovative empirical tests of partitioning that depart from 
concentration. Moreover, this chapter showed that resource partitioning based on 
organizational identity may develop in complex ways. More specifically, I claimed that 
identity-based resource partitioning may occur both at the form level and at the 
organizational level, depending on the strength of intrinsic appeal of the organizational form 
of peripheral organizations. The same factors stimulating new entries may turn out to impede 
organizational growth. Of course, the generalizability of these claims needs to be tested in 
other empirical settings. Nonetheless, these findings suggested that to gather a more complete 
and deeper understanding of partitioning processes, more attention to the distinct dynamics of 
organizational growth during partitioning is needed (see Carroll et al., 2002). Second, and 
following chapter 3, chapter 4 further contributes to the on-going discussion by mapping the 
heterogeneity of audience preferences along geographical communities (see also Hannan et 
al., 2007: 302-303) and to the set of identity research concerning the role of audience 
structure for organizational vital rates (see Kocak, Hannan & Hsu 2010). 
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 5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Needless to say, the present chapter is subject to several limitations, which I consider 
as fruitful directions for further development. First, chapter 1 presented a dynamic model 
embedded in the empirical context under study, but also attached a more general model in the 
conclusion section. In order to enhance the generalizability of the presented identity-based 
partitioning process, more work is needed to improve the general model. Second, the 
alignment between theoretical propositions and empirical measures may be improved. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, the measure of oppositional identity (Oppositional Identities) is 
based on one regional newspaper as a proxy for multiple regions. In spite of being a 
reasonable choice for an early test of my arguments (see also the second robustness check), 
more regional newspapers data should be gathered in the near future. Another potential 
concern involves the measurement of reliability (%Age Over50). In this respect, the current 
variable may be questioned on construct validity grounds and the results obtained should be 
interpreted with care. No doubts, a more appropriate measure should be developed in the 
future. In chapter 4, the current coding of engagement categories in form of cooperation is 
coarse. Thus the effects of Economic Engagement may mainly come from Local 
Independence Engagement as mentioned. To better disentangle the effects of the different 
degrees of engagement, the current coding needs to be improved. Third, the robustness of the 
results should be further checked. For example, in chapter 4 NWUs have carried out 
substantial reorganization activities by acquiring the failed regional utilities, which might 
have adverse effects on their organizational growth rates. I intend to continue working on 
robustness checks and ruling out alternative explanations. Fourth, to further check the 
validity of our results, more controls should be added to the models. For example, the NWUs 
held minority shares in some MUs which might change the audience’s perception of the 
identity of these MUs and subsequently affect their growth rates. Last, the specificity of the 
context under study and of the MU identity may be responsible for the findings obtained in 
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 this dissertation. Thus future research should test the generalizability of these findings in 
other empirical settings. 
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